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The technological revolution which has occurred in
the United States in the past quarter-century has resulted
in many changes in the environment, both social and economic.
The period following World War II has presented many rewards
from peacetime pursuits and, unfortunately for mankind,
provided the United States and its enemies with powerful,
destructive tools for the conduct of warfare. Along with the
advantages offered by this phenomenal growth, there have
arisen many challenges to management, both in the private
economy and in the military community.
A major challenge posed to the military manager is
that of providing logistical support, both maintenance and
supply, for the sophisticated weapon systems of today and
the future. Navy logistics managers have special problems
in supporting new weapons, new communication control, and
ships' propulsion systems. The systems to be supported in
the seventies represent a "quantum jump" in complexity,
performance, and cost over their counterparts of World War II
Today's demand for product variation dictates more than ever
that an activity's inventory policy be wisely chosen. Such
policies can make a real difference in the ability to
1

provide expeditious fulfillment of the requirements of sup-
ported units while minimizing the expense of maintaining an
adequate inventory. Just as the old adage attests, "for want
of a nail, a shoe is lost," the lack of a ten-cent transistor
can deprive an expensive aircraft of its primary mission
capability, and the nation is thus deprived of a portion of
its deterrent force.
Of primary importance in the support of these complex
weapon systems is the management functions performed by the
supply officer on board the nation's largest men-of-war, the
attack aircraft carriers. Operating with limited funds and
inexperienced, overworked personnel, he is faced with the
management task of procuring, receiving, storing, and issuing
the food, clothing, consumables, and repair parts required
to support the ship, an embarked air wing of approximately
eighty-five combat aircraft, and the more than 5,000 persons
required to operate and maintain the ship and aircraft. The
aircraft support alone may encompass an inventory of spare
parts of 88,000 line items with a combined dollar value of
$24 million. 1
Although this inventory of aeronautical repair parts
has increased in size by approximately 300 per cent in the
past fifteen years, the stocking objectives and inventory
1CDR M. S. Ribble, SC , USN, Director, Allowance
Control Division, Aviation Supply Office, presentation to
the 25th Annual Aviation Supply Officers' Conference,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on October 20, 1970.

management concepts are basically unchanged from those
utilized in the mid-fifties. An additional problem is that
even though the cost of repair parts required to support
these ships and aircraft has risen sharply over the past
decade, funds budgeted by Congress for support of these
inventories have been reduced substantially in the last
few years.
It is the hypothesis of this writer that the present
method of management and accounting for this ever-increasing
inventory has become obsolete and too burdensome for effec-
tive management. It has reached the point, emphasized by
Peter Drucker, that "a poor system structure makes a good
performance impossible, no matter how good the individual
manager may be. To improve the system structure . . . will
2therefore always improve performance."
The major problem would appear to be that the carrier
supply officer is asked to manage an immense inventory of
repair parts which will not be required during the life cycle
of the aircraft, let alone during a six- to nine-month
cruise. This problem, combined with the problems of insuffi-
cient, overcrowded storerooms and shortage of qualified
personnel, gives some indication of the difficult, if not
This statement is based on the writer's experience
in budgeting for aviation support while serving as Afloat
Budget Analyst on the Staff of Commander Naval Air Forces,
Atlantic Fleet, from January 1970 through May 1971-
2Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. , 1954), p. 225-

impossible, management task the supply officer has thrust
upon him.
It is proposed that the inventory system presently
utilized in the management of spare parts be replaced by a
system which allows the manager to determine his stocking
objectives and gives him an incentive to produce positive
results. As has been pointed out in a study of 308 indus-
trial firms, an improved, efficient logistics system can
reduce the on-hand inventory requirement by 50 per cent.
It is the opinion of certain personnel in the field
of logistics management, including this writer, that the
management criteria utilized by the Navy Stock Fund offers
both the incentive and the tools for the supply officer to
manage his inventory as well as substantially reduce the
amount of excess material carried aboard the naval aircraft
carriers
.
Statement of the Research Question
The research question chosen for analysis and
evaluation in this paper is:
Would shipboard implementation of the Navy Stock
Fund (NSF) inventory management procedures reduce or
eliminate the supply management problems now being
experienced on naval aircraft carriers?
John F. McCarthy, Jr. , Professor, Department of
Management Science, The George Washington University, in a
lecture given to the Navy Graduate Financial Management
Class, on February 2, 1972.

To answer this question, a number of subsidiary questions
must be answered:
1. What is the Navy Stock Fund concept and how would
it apply to shipboard inventories?
2. What effect would the Navy Stock Fund inventory
criteria have on the utilization of financial, material,
and human resources?
3. Would there be any improvement in the budgeting
and costing for aviation support?
4-. How can operational readiness of fleet units be
maintained under the revised management criteria?
Scope of the Study
The general overview of the study will deal with
aeronautical support of aviation units with specific appli-
cation toward inventory management afloat. Proven civilian
management theories will be evaluated for possible application
in the solving of the problem.
Purpose of the Study
It is the purpose of this study to analyze the
feasibility of implementing the present Navy Stock Fund
inventory management and accounting system or. board naval
aircraft carriers in a manner which will allow efficient
,
economical management without degradation of operational
readiness of the fleet units. The implementation of this
proposed system on major combat ships of the Navy has

been the subject of numerous studies and most recently was
a significant point of debate lodged within the upper
echelon of naval logistics support. The size and complexity
of the problem of shipboard inventory control validates the
necessity for a detailed study of the subject.
Research Methods Utilized and
Method of Analysis
The principal approach to the study was to delve into
the problems of the present afloat inventory management and
accounting systems and review some of the present and past
material policies which have contributed to them. Where
applicable, sound management procedures are proposed, which,
if properly implemented, will reduce, if not eliminate, these
problems.
The secondary research leading to this paper con-
sisted of an exhaustive examination of government source
documents relating to stock fund and aeronautical support in
the Navy and Air Force. Numerous books, articles, reports,
studies, and theses were reviewed and evaluated. Personal
interviews conducted with officials associated with and
experienced in the supply support and maintenance of Naval
Aviation Weapon Systems as well as Navy Stock Fund Operations
were utilized to the maximum.
Preliminary Report of SECNAV Ad Hoc Stock Fund
Review Panel
,
Eli T. Reich, Rear Admiral, USN, Chairman,
Appendix I: "Pricing, Surcharges and Credit Policy"
(Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department of the Navy, May 28,
1970), p. 20.

The primary research is based on the writer's six
years' experience in the area of supply support for naval
aircraft. These six years were divided almost equally
"between the supply department of a naval air station, as
aviation stores officer on an attack aircraft carrier, and
as a member of the supply inspection team of Commander
Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet.
The method of analysis was based on extraction and
isolation of relevant facts and ideas which pertained to
the primary research question. After this task was accom-
plished, deductive reasoning was utilized as a means of
determining whether the conclusions drawn were feasible from
a logical point of view.
Organization of the Study
In order to acquaint the reader with the long history
of success enjoyed by stock funds over the past eighty years,
Chapters II and III examine the history, establishment, and
concept of operation of the Department of Defense stock funds
with specific emphasis on the Navy Stock Fund. The latter
chapter deals with the who, what, and why of the Navy Stock
Fund.
Chapter IV evaluates the present methods of provision-
ing for naval aircraft support which tend to create excessive
stocking objectives and waste critical support funds. It
proposes revised stocking criteria based on demand and sales
under the Navy Stock Fund management criteria that will

8provide for more efficient utilization of material, financial,
and human resources. Some major incentives which will accrue
from an inventory system that allows the manager to establish
and partially control the stocking objectives of his indi-
vidual unit are pointed out in Chapter V. This is accomplished
by emphasizing the results to be expected when well-recognized
management practices are applied in this area. In addition,
this chapter inquires into the impact of the Navy Stock Fund
Inventory Management and Accounting System on budgeting for
and costing of supported naval aviation units.
Evaluation of the effects on operational readiness
of fleet units which may result from being supported by the
Navy Stock Fund procedures is conducted in Chapter VI.
Various methods of measuring effectiveness are described and
appraised. This evaluation is followed by a short compari-
son of operational readiness at present and the writer's
evaluation of future effects, if any, on fleet readiness
under the proposed system.
A brief summary of the main points and concepts of
the study and a statement of some conclusions, with
substantive reasoning, are presented in Chapter VII.
It is fully realized that, while the proposals and
recommendations brought forth in this paper are based on
sound management theory, the "real world" environment of
shipboard operations may necessitate some deviations in
order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

9Nevertheless, the basic concept appears sound and, if
adopted, should result in improved supply support for fleet
aircraft as well as substantial savings to the Navy, and




THE NAT! STOCK FUND
The Origin and Early History
of Stock Funds
The problem of having supplies and spare parts
available at the right location, in the right quantity, and
at the right time has been a major area of concern for
logistics managers since cavemen put aside extra rocks and
spare clubs for future use. No one knows who truly deserves
the title of "father of the stock fund." One outstanding
nominee, however, is Joseph, the Biblical storekeeper of the
Pharoah's graneries who set aside excess grain in the
plentiful years in preparation for the famine years of the
future. In a general sense, the "stock fund" that he main-
tained is very similar to the stock fund that is conceived
in the minds of most people today.
Although the use of stock funds in all services of
the Department of Defense is relatively new, the original
concept of this type of fund can be traced back to 1878
when a "G-eneral Account of Advances" was created in the Navy
Department. Under this procedure, all payments for supplies
by a disbursing officer first charged the General Account




which used the supplies. Since it derived its capital from
the annual appropriations of the Navy, it lacked the flexi-
bility of a true revolving fund which is not limited on an
annual basis.
As might be expected under this limited concept,
much confusion in matters of supply responsibility existed
throughout the Navy.
Secretary of the Navy Herbert, in 1896, addressed
some of the problems associated with the lack of specific
control in the Department of the Navy prior to 1886:
The general-storekeeper system was established
in the Navy ten years ago. Prior to that time the
eight bureaus of the Navy Department acted inde-
pendently of each other in the matter of purchases,
and had different methods of purchasing, keeping
accounts, caring for and issuing articles under their
cognizance. This resulted in many differing systems
of accounts, and also, as each bureau necessarily
kept many articles in stock, in large and unnecessary
accumulations of stores, bureaus often purchasing
for their own use articles, large stocks of which
were at the time lying idle in the storehouses of
other bureaus. Secretary Whitney concentrated the
entire system of purchasing for the Navy under the
Paymaster-General, and established the general-
storekeeper system, whereby all articles on hand,
no matter under what bureaus, were consolidated for
general use and placed under the control o C the
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, which was held
responsible for their purchase, care and issue.
This order naturally encountered much resistance
and may be expected to be more or less opposed as
long as the bureau system obtains. Each chief is
tempted to insist upon his right to purchase, upon
John'W. Hempstead, "A Study of the Navy Stock
Fund, 1893-1952" (unpublished Master's thesis, American
University, 1953), P- 14-.
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the plea that he knows better than any other just
what he needs.
1
In an attempt to eliminate some of the confusion as
to who would have the responsibility for purchase, manage-
ment, and distribution of Navy supplies, Congress enacted
two important acts in 1889 and 1890. The first placed the
responsibility for custody of supplies', together with the
establishment of property accounts, within the Bureau of
2Supplies and Accounts. The ensuing year proved that
although the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts had been tasked
with the responsibility for inventory management in the Navy,
the operating bureaus would not furnish them the authority
for use of their funds. To improve this situation, Congress
passed a second act in 1890 which stated in part: "... all
supplies purchased with moneys appropriated by this Act
shall be deemed to be purchased for the Navy and not for any
Bureau thereof, and these supplies together consolidated,
and catalogued, and issued for consumption or use, under
such regulations as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe,
without regard to the bureau for which they are purchased."
These two acts resulted in significant improvements
in the acquisition and control of material consumed in the
U.S., Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Navy for the Year 18% (Washington, D.C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 30-31
•
2U.S., 25 Stat. 817, Act of March 2, 1889.
5U.S., 26 Stat. 205, Act of June 30, 1890.
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operation and maintenance of Naval equipment, but the adminis-
trative details involved when the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts attempted to utilize various appropriations for
purchase created excessive delays between the initiation of
a requirement and its fulfillment.
In his annual report of 1892, the Paymaster-General
of the Navy, Edwin Stewart, addressed this problem and recom-
mended that authority and funds be granted by Congress to
establish a permanent working capital. His report stated:
A source of embarrassment is found in the delay
necessarily incident to filling emergency requisi-
tions for articles not in store of which purchase
must be made. The laws of 1890 and 1891 provide that
all supplies purchased from appropriations for the
naval service shall be considered as belonging to the
Navy and not to any particular bureau. These laws have
an admirable tendency to limit purchases to absolute
foreseen necessities, as chiefs of bureaus naturally
object to approving requisitions for the purchase of
supplies out of appropriations under their control,
which may in possible contingencies be diverted to
the uses of other departments. There should, however,
be always on hand sufficient supplies to meet constant
demands. Delays would be obviated if there could be
kept always in store a stock of ordinary commercial
articles to be replenished from time to time by requisi-
tions emanating from the general storekeeper. In order
to secure this end by a method that could in no way be
objectionable to the several bureaus, I would respect-
fully recommend that Congress be asked to create a
fund amounting to $200,000, to be known as the supply
fund, out of which ordinary commercial articles may be
purchased on requisitions originated by general store-
keepers and approved by the Paymaster-G-eneral ; such
supplies when issued to the different departments to
be charged against the proper appropriation, and the
fund reimbursed and in this way kept intact. This
would not entail any expenditure in excess of the
regular annual appropriation; it would prevent deten-
tion of ships needed for sudden and immediate service
and would enable the purchase by contract, after

14
public advertisement, of a large quantity of supplies
which now must of necessity be procured in the open
market under emergency requisitions.!
As a result of this request, Congress created a
"permanent" Naval Supply Fund in the total amount of $200,000
in the spring of 1893- The utilization of the newly created
fund was limited "to the purchase of ordinary commercial
supplies for the naval service, and to be reimbursed from
the proper naval appropriations whenever the supplies pur-
2
chased under said fund are issued for use."
The initial capital for the fund was advanced from
the annual "General Account of Advances," rather than by
separate appropriation. The permanent nature of the fund
was provided in the creation of a legal entity which could
purchase, hold, and sell supplies without regard to fiscal
year limitations, and which would maintain its integrity
from the proceeds of its sales to appropriated funds.
As this Act provided a major management tool for
increased control and improved accounting, the Naval Supply
Fund was well received by the Naval Bureaus. In fact, it
was accepted and utilized to the degree that Congress found
it necessary to approve four separate requests for additional
working capital during the time frame of 1892 through 1902.
U.S., Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the
Paymaster-General of the Navy for the Year 1892 (Washington,
D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1892), p. 57
2U.S., 27 Stat. 723, Act of March 3, 1893-
5U.S., 32 Stat. 17, Act of February 14, 1902.
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These additional funds expanded the fund until "working
capital" within the Naval Supply Fund totaled $2.7 million
in 1902. 1
The Naval Supply Account
The events of the first decade of the twentieth
century led to a major change in the method of accounting
for the physical material in the fund and gave birth to the
"Naval Supply Account," which was later changed to the Naval
Stock Account as it is known today.
In 1907, after several unsuccessful attempts to have
Congress appropriate more funds to finance his rapidly
increasing requirements for the fund, Paymaster General
Rogers drafted a letter for the Secretary of the Navy's
release which directed "that all material which has been
purchased from annual appropriations be transferred to and
incorporated into the Naval Supply Fund. Thereafter all
such material will have its value debited to the appropri-
ations under which it is drawn and credited to the Naval
2Supply Fund." Unfortunately, this letter was released by
the Acting Secretary of the Navy in the absence of Secretary
Meyer.
Thus, with one signature of a directive, the inclu-
sion of the "common general stores" inventory in the amount
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, History of Navy Stock Fund and Naval Supply Account
[Washington, D.C.
,







of approximately $9.5 million raised the total value of the
Naval Supply Fund to $12.2 million, without the need of
Congress to appropriate a cent by law.
Secretary Meyer, upon learning what had happened in
his absence, declared the action illegal, since it was not
sanctioned by Congressional law, and drafted a letter to
2the Attorney General requesting an opinion on the subject.
Paymaster General Rogers vigorously opposed the
Secretary's stand and presented the argument that "this
transfer of stores was not an increase in the money value of
the fund and that a distinction should be made between the
stores or stock placed in the fund and the Navy Supply Fund
and that the fund itself was not disturbed."
At the recommendation of the Attorney General and
Secretary of the Navy, with concurrence by Paymaster-General
Rogers and the House Naval Affairs Committee, the accounting
firm of Marwick, Mitchell and Company was employed "to study
the whole situation as well as to devise a system of cost
accounting for the various activities which managed the
zj.
physical inventory of the fund."
The recommendations which resulted from this
extensive study eliminated many problem areas, and a signifi-
cant portion of those recommendations which were put into













These recommendations were the basis for legislation
which established the Naval Supply Account in 1910. This
act stated:
Naval supply account for the Naval Establishment:
All stores on hand July First, nineteen hundred and
ten, shall be charged to a naval supply account on the
records of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and
all purchases of stock or expenditures for manufactured
or repaired articles for stock at navy-yards or sta-
tions, during the fiscal years nineteen hundred and
eleven and nineteen hundred and twelve, shall be charged
to this account and be paid for from the "General
Account of Advances."
The amount so advanced during the fiscal years nine-
teen hundred and eleven and twelve shall be charged to
the proper appropriations as these stores are consumed
from stock, and when disbursements made for all other
purposes are accomplished, the amount so charged shall
be returned to "General Account of Advances" by pay or
counter warrants: Provided, however, that such material
as provisions, clothing and small stores, medical stores,
and such other materials as the Secretary of the Navy
may designate, may be purchased by specific appropri-
ations or transferred to specific appropriations before
such materials are issued for use or consumptions. The
said charge, however, to any particular appropriation
shall be limited to the amount appropriated therefor.
2
The provisions of this act were subsequently made
permanent by the Act of March 4-, 19-L1, which also abolished
the "first permanent Naval Supply Fund." Because of the
importance of the 1910 act, a short explanation is necessary.
It combined all the stores in the Naval establishment into
one fund, with a total value, including ordnance and ordnance




2U.S., 36 Stat. 792, Act of June 25, 1910.
5U.S., $6 Stat. 1279, Act of March 4, 1911.




significantly more than the previous legal monetary limit of
the Naval Supply Fund, which was $2.7 million.
The wording of the new act allowed a limit in the
amount set up on the hooks of the Treasury in the "General
Account of Advances," which, in reality, was the total of the
annual naval appropriations. This created speculation by
Congress about whether a limit should be placed on the amount
of funds that could be invested in stock, on the theory that
large surpluses might arise as a result of unwise buying.
However, the Secretary of the Navy dismissed its apprehen-
sions with the issuance of General Order No. 69, which
directed that:
In order to prevent any further undue accumulation
of supplies and ma erials at the various navy yards and
stations, the Depa -tment hereby directs that on and
after July 1, 1910, all requisitions for stock supplies
and materials shall be submitted to the Paymaster General
of the Navy for approval or disapproval according to his
judgment, based on the quantities reported to be on hand
or available for shipment from other yards or
stations.
Requisitions, i.e., those intended to cover pur-
chase of supplies or material needed for immediate use
or for a specific ourpose, shall be submitted to the
Paymaster General of the Navy via the bureaus concerned.
If in the opinion of the Paymaster General any such
requisition shall not be approved, then he shall dis-
approve and submit it immediately to the Department,
with his reasons for the action taken.
1
Many of the requirements established by this order are still
in effect for ordering the material that composes the Navy







The accounting system for inventory management and
reporting that was set up by the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts as a result of the Warwick and Mitchell study and
report, in 1910, has remained the same, with the exception
of a few minor refinements, and is utilized today.
Growth of the Fund from
1910 to l^J
The quarter-century from 1910 through 1939 saw the
Naval Stock Fund put to extensive use in the successful
procurement and management of the vast amount of material
required for the Navy during World War I. Although the Fund
was extremely active in an operational sense, there were few
changes in its organization or purpose. The only legisla-
tion which reflected other than an insignificant effect on
the Naval Supply Account's management during this time was
1 2
seven acts dealing with equipage exemption, disposal losses,
5 . . 4.
excesses and deficiencies m Navy appropriations, pricing,
operating expenses, including transportation costs as a
6
cost of material, and the stocking of publications and forms







38 Stat. 405, Act of June 30, 1914-
.
41 Stat. 825, Act of June 4, 1920.
41 Stat. 1169, Act of March 1, 1921.
41 Stat. 1170, Act of March 1, 1921.
42 Stat. 132, Act of July 12, 1921.
45 Stat. 633, Act of May 21, 1928.
45 Stat. 1461, Act of March 2, 1929.
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In an effort to dispose of excess war material,
there was a significant trend toward substantially reducing
the size of the fund during the span of "peaceful years"
stretching from the close of World War I until immediately
prior to World War II.
The total value of the Naval Supply Account as of
the end of fiscal year 1921 was $265.6 million, of which
approximately $250 million was invested in material. By
the end of fiscal year 1959, this excessive amount had been
2
reduced to approximately $70 million. It is significant
that not all of this reduction was excess material. A
portion of it was brought about by the reevaluation of
inventory and by outright recisions of cash in the amount
of $84 million, as well as by numerous donations to activities
authorized by Congress during this period.
Stock Fund Contributions
During World War II
The deteriorating situation in Europe and the
declaration of a state of national emergency by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt on September 5, 1939, dictated that
the fund again be expanded in preparation for war. Various
Congressional Acts from June 11, 1940 through December, 23,
1943, increased the fund over a billion and a half dollars.





p. 64. 3Ibid ., pp. 45-55.
^Hempstead, "Study of Navy Stock Fund," pp. 166-70.
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The final portion of this legislation, in December, 194-3,
placed a limit on the fund in that: "... after June 30,
194-4- , the value of stock in the 'Naval Stock Account' plus
the outstanding obligations under the 'Naval Stock Fund'
shall not exceed $2,2^0,000,000 at any time." 1
Two acts of legislation which were passed during that
time span were important for reasons other than appropriation
of funds. They were the 194-2 acts of February 7 and July 3,
which, respectively, removed the supplies and materials on
board vessels from the Naval Supply Account Fund and changed
the name of the account.
The February act read as follows:
Naval Supply Account Fund, $160,000,000: Pro-
vided, that the value of the balances of supplies
and materials on board naval vessels on January 1,
194-2, shall be expended from the Naval Supply
Account, as directed by the Secretary of the Navy,
without charge to current appropriations.
2
After World War II, the stocks of "general stores"
carried aboard larger ships with central storerooms were
once again financed under the Stock Fund. The stocks of
materials carried on destroyers and smaller ships were
expended to end use and placed in the custody of the depart-
ments that ordered them. This system was the standard
operating procedure (SOP) until the early fifties when it
was decided that shipboard inventories of general stores
1U.S., 57 Stat. 626, Act of December 23, 194-3
2U.S., 56 Stat. 79, Act of February 7, 194-2.
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and repair parts could be managed and controlled through the
use of allowance lists and load lists which were under the
control of the fleet. This decision, in addition to a pro-
nounced desire to reduce the accounting "paperwork load" of
combat units, caused the abolishment of stock funded ship-
board inventories. Instead, these stocks were charged to
fleet operating funds when transferred to the ship. This
procedure was also extended to fleet issue ships, tenders,
and repair ships.
After the Korean conflict, when operating funds began
to feel the impact of peacetime reductions, stocks of material
carried aboard tenders and fleet issue ships could not be
maintained at levels required for adequate fleet support.
This problem was corrected by the return of stock funded
inventories to fleet issue ships in 3 955 and to fleet tender
and repair vessels in 1958.
Although the removal of ship ' s spares from the Navy
Stock Fund was supposedly an effort to eliminate the burden
2
of accounting functions under a combat environment, it is
significant that inventories on board combat vessels, with
the exception of tenders and repair ships, have not been
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts, The Navy Stock Fund Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 1958 , NAVSANDA Publication 263, P- 5-
Kermit E. Beck, "The Navy Stock Fund: A Tool for
Economy and Efficiency" (unpublished Master's thesis, The
George Washington University, 1968), p. 29.
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returned to Navy Stock Fund management at the present time,
which is twenty "relatively peaceful" years later.
In an effort to make the Naval Supply Account Fund
a "true storekeeping account" and relieve various accounting
transactions in the procurement of material and services not
regularly stocked, the Navy Procurement Fund was established
by Congressional Act of 19^-2, which read in part:
That there is hereby established under the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts the Naval Procurement Fund, and
there is authorized to be appropriated from time to
time such sums as may be necessary to accomplish the
purposes of this fund: Provided, that thereafter
expenditures may be made from the Naval Procurement
Fund for material (other than material for stock) and
for personal and contractual services under such regu-
lations as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe:
Provided further that the Naval Supply Account Fund
shall hereafter be designated as the Naval Stock
Fund. . . .1
The major problem concerning the fund during World
War II appears to have been the loss of control that resulted
from the explosive growth of operations. This loss of
control is exemplified by the fact that in March, 19^-3, the
fund had a $600 million deficit, caused by the prevailing
concept of getting the supply job done without regard to
financial considerations.
The return to a peacetime level of operations and
the reduction of accumulated inventories provided excess
cash in the fund. During 194-6 and 194-7 » Congress provided
1U.S., 56 Stat. 64-6, Act of July 3, 194-2.





for rescission of approximately $7^0 million from the Naval
Stock Fund and its return to the Treasury or transfer to
other appropriations. From 194-7 "to 194-9, when Congress was
considering wider use of working capital funds within the
Defense Department, activity in the Naval Stock Fund was
routine. The Naval Stock Fund, however, was serving a
larger purpose than support of the Navy: by its example of
an established, effective supply and financial system which
had supported Naval operations in three wars, it led the way
for wider use of stock funds in the Department of Defense.
Stock Fund Enlargement to Entire
Department of Defense
The stock fund, or "working capital" concept, was
greatly enhanced in 194-8 and 1949, when the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the
First Hoover Commission) conducted its review of governmental
organizations and operations. A substantial portion of this
review was devoted to study of the operation of the National
Security Organization. Specifically, it recommended that
the Secretary of Defense direct and supervise a major
revision of the entire budget system, with particular
2
emphasis on initiating a performance-type budget. The
U.S. , Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Herbert Hoover, Chairman, National
Security Organization , A Report to the Congress (Washington,







precedent that the Naval Stock Fund had set for working-
capital funds was well recognized in the consideration of
the proposed legislation. The Senate and House reports on
the bill both discussed the Naval Stock Fund, emphasizing
its long existence and the benefits achieved by proper
handling of inventories of common use items. In this vein,
the testimony of W. J. McNeil , who was later appointed Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), submitted that:
The Department of the Navy has had this very
excellent tool for management for 54- years. It
started 54- years ago, as a rather small business
operation, and was very helpful in World War I.
It was carried on In a substantial size through
the twenties and thirties and stood the test of
World War II in excellent fashion.
After review of the recommendations of the First
Hoover Commission, and with President Truman's urging,
Congress passed a bill which was known as Title IV of the
National Security Act of 194-7 > as amended. "In order to
more effectively control and account for the cost of pro-
grams and work performed in the Department of Defense," the
legislation authorized the Secretary of Defense
to require the establishment of working-capital funds
in the Department of Defense for the purpose of
(1) financing inventories of such stores, supplies,
materials, and equipment as he may designate; and
U.S., Congress, Senate, National Security Act Amend-
ments of 194-9
, Ept. 366, 81st Cong., 1st sess.. May 12, 194-9,
pp. 292-93; and U.S., Congress, House, Reorganizing Fiscal
Management in the National Military Establishment , Rpt. 1064-
81st Cong., 1st sess., July 14, 194-9, pp. 9-10.
2 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
National Security Act Amendments of 194-9 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 194-9), p. 2669-
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(2) providing working capital for such industrial-
type activities, and for such commercial-type activities
as provide common services within or among the depart-
ments and agencies of the Department of Defense, as he
may designate.
(b) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
and directed to establish on the books of the Treasury
Department at the request of the Secretary of Defense
the working-capital funds established pursuant to the
authority of this section.
(c) Such funds shall be . . .
(1) charged, when appropriate, with the
cost of stores, supplies, materials, and equipment
procured or otherwise acquired, manufactured,
repaired, issued, and consumed and of services
rendered or work performed, including applicable
administrative expense; and
(2) reimbursed from available appropriations
or otherwise credited for the cost of stores, supplies,
materials, or equipment furnished and of services
rendered or work performed, including applicable
administrative expenses.
Reports of the condition and operations of such funds
shall be made annually to the President and to the
Congress.
(h) The appraised value of all stores, supplies,
materials, and equipment returned to such working-capital
funds from any department, activity, or agency, may be
charged to the working-capital fund concerned and the
proceeds thereof shall be credited to the current appro-
priations concerned; the amounts so credited shall be
available for expenditures for the same purposes as the
appropriations credited. . . .1
Since this time, the monetary portion of the Navy
Stock Fund has been regulated through the apportionment proce-
2dures in the budgetary process.
Although the Navy was well experienced in the operation
of a "revolving fund," the requirements imposed by the act
1U.S., Public Law 216, 81st Cong., August 10, 194-9.
Robert D. Fischer, "The Navy Stock Fund" (unpublished




necessitated some changes in its method of operation. While
the principal purpose of the fund had "been to finance inven-
tories of supplies and equipment, over the years the fund had
also become involved in financing manufacturing and processing
activities. The principal operations of this nature were the
following:
Coffee roasting
Cutting and fabricating items of uniform
Foundry work on small castings
Generating and bottling of gas
Manufacture of electrical fittings
Paint mixing and blending
Renovation of petroleum drums
Rope manufacture.
1
As the new operating regulations did not permit activities
of this type in stock funds, these activities were ceased
either by termination or by transfer to the new Navy Indus-
trial Fund. This action was completed by fiscal year 1953.
Under the authority contained in Section ^05 of
Public Law 81-216, the Army and Air Force established a stock
2fund in the latter half of 1950. Both of these funds were
established on a very limited basis relative to what they
would encompass in the next few years. The Marine Corps was
U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Comp-
troller, Working Capital Funds of the Department of Defense
,
Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1952 (Washin-
ton, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1952).
p
U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Comp-
troller, Working Capital Funds of the Department of Defense
,
Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1951 (Washing-
ton, D.C: Government Printing Office, 195l)«
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the last military service to commence stock fund operations,
on July 1, 1953.
-1
A fifth stock fund was added to the Department of
Defense with the establishment of the "Defense Supply Stock
Fund" on January 1, 1962. This fund was established to
finance the inventories of the Defense Supply Agency. The
significant difference between this fund and the service stock
funds is in the method of operation. The Defense Stock Fund
inventory consists entirely of "wholesale" stocks, procured
from industry and held for sale to other "retail" stock funds
of the services for ultimate sale to users, while the service
stock funds include both "wholesale" stocks (for items not
under Defense Supply Agency cognizance) and "retail" stocks
. . . 2positioned near points of ultimate use.
The establishment of the Defense Supply Stock Fund
has had a tremendous effect on the operation of the stock
funds of the military services. Since the stocking criteria
for this fund is "to include all material which is commonly
used by two or more of the services," it has absorbed a large
portion of high-usage, fast-moving material from the inven-
tories of the service funds. The result has been smaller
inventories as well as a reduction of sales in a greater than
Alfred C. Taves, "Marine Corps Stock Fund 1953-1967"
(unpublished Master's thesis, The George Washington University,
1968), p. 2. .
pGeorge W. Erdman, "The Use of Stock Funds in the
Department of Defense" (unpublished thesis, Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, 1964), p. 27-
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one-to-one ratio of sales to inventory, because of the high
salability of the material transferred to the Defense Supply-
Stock Fund.
It is significant that the Department of Defense is
not the sole user of revolving funds in the United States
Government. The index of the United States Code ' carries a
listing of over twenty governmental revolving funds of various
types, without mentioning any that exist in the Department of
Defense. Another type of major "working capital fund" other
than the stock fund, which exists within the Department of
Defense, is the industrial funds of the individual military
departments and the Defense Supply Agency.
The Korean "police action" in 1950 again necessitated
the expansion of the Naval Stock Fund as it had during
previous periods of conflict (see Figure l). A total increase
of $625 million was added to the fund as the result of laws
2 5 4passed in January, May, and October of 1951. These cash
augmentations permitted the fund to continue to provide effec-
tive current support of the naval establishment and to under-
take an orderly program of increasing its readiness stocks to
meet anticipated needs. While the fund was being increased
-'•U.S. Code (1968 ed.), p. 11065.
2U.S., Public Law 911, 81st Cong., January 6, 1951.
5U.S.,. Public Law 45, 82d Cong., May 31, 1951.




















Fig. 1.—Growth of the Navy Stock Fund
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to support the war effort, individual extensions of the stock
fund concept were being accomplished. Medical and dental
supplies in the amount of $96, 536,935 were capitalized into
the Navy Stock Fund on June 30, 1952, as were certain common
electronics items totaling $105,030,000 on June 30, 1953. 2
As was to he expected, the ceasing of hostilities in
Korea saw Congress anxious to reduce the Navy Stock Fund to
a peacetime inventory to wait until another conflict required
its expansion. It is interesting to note that with the
inclusion of a $250 million recision in Fiscal Year 1954-
,
Congress had recouped over 50 per cent ($1.3 billion of
$2.5 billion) of all funds which had been appropriated to the
fund since its inception in 1893-
Congressional Appraisal of Stock Funds
An indication of the effectiveness and efficiency
that the stock funds were accomplishing in the area of military
supply management is expressed in a statement in the Defense
Department's report on working capital funds for fiscal year
1954- :
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, The Navy Stock Fund Annual Report for Fiscal Year
1952, NAVSANDA Publication 263, p. 4-.
2U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, The Navy Stock Fund Annual Report for Fiscal Year
1955 , NAVSANDA Publication 263, p. 3-
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, The Navy Stock Fund Annual Report for Fiscal Year
1954-
,
NAVSANDA Publication 263, p. 36.
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The stock fund lias made a major contribution in
the procurement aspect of supply management. It has
facilitated the determination of fund requirements,
by relating the allotment and control of procurement
funds with issue requirements and existing stock
levels. As a result, receipt to active stocks from
procurement for fiscal year 1954 were approximately
$224 million less than the issues of $1,281 million
for the same period. This improved approach has
resulted in cutbacks and cancellations of existing
orders and has brought the "on order" position more
nearly in line with requirements for production lead
time.-*-
In 1953? as part of the report of the House Committee
on Government Operations, the stock fund concept was endorsed
as follows:
The use of stock funds simplifies accounting and
budgeting. Stock funds can improve the ability of a
good manager to do an effective Job in purchasing and
in inventory control. It is generally acknowledged
that the use of stock funds will simplify Congressional
control of operations by allowing Congress to maintain
control over consumption by the appropriate process
with better knowledge of previous consumption and of
quantities of repetitive use material on hand.
The Second Hoover Commission, established in 1953 for
a second review of the Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, in its Budgeting and Accounting report
issued in 1955, discusses several of the previously stated
advantages demonstrated by Defense Department operations,
U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Comptrol-
ler, Working Capital Funds of the Department of Defense , Annual
Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1954, p- 19.
2U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Military Supply Management
,
Rept. 857? 83d Cong., 1st
sess.
, 1953-
5U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Herbert Hoover, Chairman, Budget and
Accounting
, A Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C. : Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1955), P- 39.
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but also enumerates some negative aspects of the method:
The principal disadvantages of these revolving
funds are that they minimize Congressional control of
agency operations and that their widespread use can
result in too many pockets of funds which become
cumbersome from the standpoint of administration.
Our task force believes that revolving funds should
be used only in situations where they provide greater
economy and efficiency than do direct appropriations.
1
This feeling toward stock funds apparently caused
the Commission to make a recommendation "that the creation or
continuation of revolving funds should be reviewed to deter-
mine if they add to efficient management, once the Government
establishes appropriate accrual and cost accounting
ptechniques.
"
The Commission's report on the Defense Department's
business organization treats working-capital funds slightly
more favorably. It states that the revolving fund device has
been found particularly valuable where a buyer-seller rela-
tionship exists; that such funds, reinforced by adequate cost
accounting systems, contribute to improved management control;
and that the continued and extended use of working-capital







VU.S. , Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Herbert Hoover, Chairman, Business
Organization of the Department of Defense , A Report to the




Recommendation 17 of this report states in part:
"... the Department of Defense should continue and extend
the use of systems of accrual and cost accounting and, wherever
it will add to efficient management, the use of working capital
funds. ..." The report also notes that "when the capital
in a stock fund exceeds the amount required to support the
required inventory, the excess is readily highlighted, and
Congress and the Secretary of Defense can take prompt action
p
to reduce the size of the fund." This last statement was
put to good use by Congress in later years as over $1.1 billion
was rescinded from the Wavy Stock Fund in the period from
195^ through 1961. 5
Stock Fund Operations from 1955 to Present
During the years following the Second Hoover Commission
report, great emphasis was placed on economy and efficiency
in the Department of Defense, with specific attention focused
on measuring and controlling the use of operation and mainte-
nance appropriations. The Navy Department, therefore,
reemphasized increased utilization of the Navy Stock Fund.
An ad hoc committee, which was formed to "examine methods and
procedures for material requirements determination and
budgeting thereof," made the following recommendations








^Fischer, "The Navy Stock Fund," p. 33-
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The Committee believes that the Navy Stock Fund
should be extended to the APA (Appropriation Purchase
Account) spare parts inventories. This should elimi-
nate many of the shortcomings in the present require-
ments computations, budget preparation and management
relationships.
The Stock Fund should have the following major
advantages
:
(1) Parallel management and funding responsibilities,
(2) Provide for a consumption type budget rather
than a stock inventory budget.
(3) Balancing of mobilization' reserve stocks between
inventories.
(4) Determination of financial requirements of the
SDCP's (Supply Demand Control Points) can be on a more
current basis, closer to the time the annual Defense
budget is submitted to Congress.
(5) Simplify the accounting for material issued
from the inventories and returned to store—all such
operations will be from one fund.
It is appreciated that the inclusion of all items
of SDCP inventories will represent a departure from
the original concept that only items of a "replenish-
able demand" nature are suitable for incorporation into
the fund. The concept of "replenishable demand" type
material must be broadened to encompass a more modern
concept that items which have an "expected demand" are
suitable stock to be included and are not necessarily
subject to rapid turnover, and that the rate of stock
turn cannot be used as a measure of the effectiveness
of management when applied to the gross inventory
valuation.
1
This proposal was a major change from the concept that
the Navy Stock Fund had utilized up to this time. Throughout
its history, the self-perpetuating nature of the Stock Fund
was emphasized, and it was limited to the procurement of only
those standard materials that were widely used throughout the
Navy. Great care was exercised to avoid the stockage of
U. S. , • Department of the Navy, Office of Analysis and
Review, Findings and Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee
to Examine Methods and Procedures for Material Requirements
Determination and Budgeting Therefor




supplies which had limited usage or limited shelf-life and
thus might result in losses to the fund. Such minor losses
as did occur were recovered through assessment of a surcharge
on issue prices.
As was previously pointed out, Public Lav/ 216 provides
for stock fund financing of "all materials procured and/or
stocked for supply purposes. This is intended to include all
consumable types of material and relatively minor items of
equipment. ..." The Secretary of Defense was given authority
to determine the particular stores to be financed under these
working capital funds.
Within a year after this report was published, the
Department of Defense issued an instruction which gave the
following criteria for inclusion of items in stock funds:
All material procured and/or stored for supply pur-
poses. This is intended to include all consumable types
of material and relatively minor items of equipments,
including parts and components used in manufacture,
assembly, maintenance or rebuild of end-items for the
military supply system. The term "consumable" material
is used in the sense of covering all material which may
be considered to be expended to operating and maintenance
appropriations when withdrawn from a stock fund for use.^
It is this liberalized authority which has served as
a basis for the extension of stock fund financing to cover
procurement of technical repair parts.
This capitalization of Appropriation Purchase Account
(APA) inventories (photographic material, ship's repair parts,
U.S., Department of Defense, Principles to Be Observed
in Determining Material to Be Included in Stock Funds , DOD
Instruction 7420.5, November 26, 1956.
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and electronic and vehicular equipment parts) was conducted
without reimbursement, during fiscal years 1956 through 1961,
p
and amounted to approximately Si, 611 million. By the end of
fiscal year 1961, the only major category of consumahles
remaining outside the Navy Stock Fund was the aeronautical
sparts, with an estimated value of $2.5 billion. The size
of the Navy Stock Account had grown from 260,000 items in
1954
4
to 807,000 items in 1961. 5
The capitalization of the APA material into the Stock
Fund allowed the Navy to manage over three times as many items
without an increase in capital. In fact, as previously
mentioned, the Fund was able to return over $1 billion to
Congress from 195^ through 1961. This was the result of the
efficiencies in the stock funding criteria. The capitaliza-
tion of these inventories into the fund had the immediate
effect of generating surpluses and items in long supply.
(The reasons for this effect will be discussed in a later
chapter.) Since these items were in long supply, they could
be sold to the operating forces without the need for replenish-
ment upon issue. Additionally, many items which had become
Secretary of the Navy Notice 4A00, May 21, 1956.
2Fischer, "The Navy Stock Fund," p. 35-
^Beck, "The Navy Stock Fund," p. 35-





^U.S. , Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, The Navy Stock Fund Report for Fiscal Year 1961
,
NAVSANDA Publication 263, p. 3-
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obsolete by the technological boom of the fifties were
declared surplus and disposed of at a loss to the fund.
Despite the criticism which had been brought about
by the inclusion of "technical spare parts" into the Navy
Stock Fund, the "net effectiveness of material availability
in the system" for the selected categories of material which
had been capitalized into the Fund had increased by i960 as
demonstrated by Table 1. The effectiveness of support was
actually being increased, while economies were being made by
the system.
In the year that followed, it appeared that the Navy
logistics managers had established the "ultimate tool" for
the management of military inventories. The Navy Stock Fund
had finally commenced the financial management of all con-
sumable inventories (except aeronautical spares) and that the
operating appropriations were truly reflecting consumption
costs. They were in good favor with Congress and with their
bosses in the Department of Defense, as was expressed by the
following comment by Congress:
The Army and Navy have made widespread use of
stock funds in almost every applicable area. Their
progress in the past five years is commendable.
1
The Department of Defense reiterated its policy by
stating: "It has been and is presently the objective to
U. S. ,. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, The Opera-
tion of Stock Funds in the Military Establishment
,
Report of
the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 86th Cong., 2d
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Electronic s
(N .Cog) 82.0% 87.4% 89.0% 95-7% 91.4%
Ship Parts
(H Cog) 77-6 85.5 89.2 92.1 89-9
Submarine Parts
(P Cog) N/A 89.9 88.9 97-0 90.2
Photographic
Material
(E Cog) N/A 77-6 81.8 78.5 89.0
Source: U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies




Fiscal Years 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, and I960.
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extend as expeditiously as feasible the use of stock funds
on a uniform "basis for the military departments based upon
maximum appropriate use of this authority.
It is ironic that, just two years later, in a report
issued by the General Accounting Office in 1962, the balloon
of Congressional praise should burst. The report, which
was initiated by Congressman John W. McCormack, disclosed
that
the preparedness ... of individual Navy combat and
service ships of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, was
being seriously affected by their inability to obtain
repair parts and other material required for combat
readiness although such material was available in the
stock fund inventory. We found that the immediate
cause for this was the insufficiency of consumer funds
at the level of the ships to purchase this material
from the stock funds. The inability to obtain the
needed material significantly contributed to or was
directly responsible for . . . ships being operated
without certain essential material on board that
would be needed in an emergency.
2
The General Accounting Office further substantiated
its report by disclosing that nineteen of thirty-one ships
visited had shortages of over 1,700 line items in the total
value of hundreds of thousands of dollars. This unfortunate
situation existed even though in most cases the required
material was available from supply sources in the individual





2U.S., General Accounting Office, Report on Review
of Stock Funds and Related Consumer Funds in the Department
of Defense
,






that "military activities resorted to various uneconomical
practices in order to obtain parts and other combat material
to accomplish their mission when consumer funds were short at
their level, such as "stripping" material from ships which
were scheduled for decommissioning.
The report made a further recommendation that, in this
writer's opinion, demonstrated that the auditors had missed
the crux of the problem and possibly did not understand the
theory behind the Navy Stock Fund operations. The recommenda-
tion was that
:
The Secretary of Defense either (1) provide that
consumer funds for repair parts and other combat
material remain at the departmental levels rather than
be allotted to and through the various command strata
and that the procuring activities be reimbursed from
these funds as material is issued to users or (2) elimi-
nate completely the use of such consumer funds for
repair parts and other combat material and have this
material financed by annual appropriations from the
Congress.
2
The conclusion hypothesized by this writer is that the
problem was one of insufficient appropriation funding for
operating units to purchase the material which previously had
not been chargeable through the Navy Stock Fund. This conclu-
sion is explicitly pointed out in letters from both the
Atlantic and the Pacific fleet commanders to the Chief of
Ibid
.




^Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Letter,
serial 2936/41/440, dated August 30, 1962; and Commander in




Naval Operations, in 1962, prior to the date of the General
Accounting Office report.
The consumption figures on which the "budget was based
appear to be for actual items consumed on board the vessels.
Under the revised procedure, the ships were paying not only
for that consumption, but also for the buildup of onboard spare
parts held in the storerooms. If this fact had not been con-
sidered during a period of rigid funding, as the late 1950'
s
were after the cessation of the Korean conflict, limited funds
would have been utilized for operating consumption only. The
storeroom material would have become depleted as used because
of the lack of sufficient funds for replacement of inventories.
The recommendation of the General Accounting Office
poses a question in logic. How will the proposal to place
consumer funds at the department level eliminate the problem
of insufficient funding? This writer feels that it will be
likely to create a larger problem as the ultimate consumer (the
fleet unit) would consider all material "free issue" and refuse
to let economy stand in the way of operational readiness.
The department would be responsible for the funds but would
have no direct control over the end user of these funds.
The recommendation "to have all repair parts and other
combat material financed by annual appropriations from Con-
gress" appears to be a giant step backwards in the attempt to
evaluate true consumption costs of the fleet units.

4-3
The problems pointed out by the General Accounting
Office and the fleet commander reports of similar conditions
led to a study of the Stock Fund by the Department of Defense
in 1962.
The approval of the recommendations of this study by
the Secretary of Defense led to the removal of over 214-,000
newly defined "principal" items valued at $329 million from
the Navy Stock Account during the fiscal years 1964- and 1965.
The reasoning behind this philosophy of including and
excluding items from the Navy Stock Fund does not appear to
solve the problem which was caused by lack of adequate consumer
funds. The funding problem is not eliminated, but only pushed
up the echelon of command, as the responsible bureau will still
be required to maintain system stock.
A similar problem arose in the management of the Navy
Stock Fund with the capitalization of 300,000 items of aero-
nautical consumable material valued at approximately $1,04-8
2
million into the fund on July 1, 1968. This transfer created
substantial problems for the fund in the areas of budgeting,
sales-turn ratio, and the existence of excess items.
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, The Navy Stock Fund Annual Report for Fiscal Year
1964- ; and U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, The Navy Stock Fund Annual Report for Fiscal Year
1963 , NAVSANDA Publications 263.
2
U. S. ,. Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems




These problems are approximately the same that arose
when all Appropriation Purchase Account (APA) material was
capitalized into the fund during the 1956 through I960 time
frame. As previously, a SECNAV Ad Hoc Stock Fund Review Panel
was established by the Secretary of the Navy in November, 1969.
However, this problem was different in that the Navy Stock
Fund faced a "cash liquidity crisis" of an estimated $110 mil-
lion working capital deficiency for fiscal year 1970. This
crisis was deemed to be the result of "the Southeast Asia
(Vietnam) buildup, the huge migration of aviation material to
the Navy Stock Fund and the increasing ratio of insurance items
2to fast-moving items.
"
In its report published on May 28, 1970, the committee
made numerous comments and recommendations for improving the
operation of the Navy Stock Fund. As the majority of these
relate to or have a bearing on aviation support of the fleet,
they will be evaluated and discussed in later chapters of this
report.
Summary
Although numerous articles and studies on Naval Stock
Fund history have been written over the past thirty years, the
information which they contain is dated and tends to approach
the history of the fund from a legislative angle. In this
chapter, the writer has reviewed the fund's history from the
Preliminary Report of SECNAV Ad Hoc Stock Fund Review
Panel
, Eli T. Reich, Rear Admiral, USN, Chairman { Washington,






aspect of its long and successful operation and growth over
the past eighty years, as well as citing important legislative
actions pertaining to the fund.
The success and efficiency demonstrated by the Navy
Stock Fund management system, even during times of turmoil
resulting from extended periods of conflict, has enabled the
Department of Defense Stock Funds to grow from a mere $200,000
in 1893 to its present inventory value of $9, 384,000,000, 1
whicti generated annual sales during fiscal year 1971 of
$10,519,000,000. 2
The favorable comments and expressed feelings of the
various logistics experts and congressional reviewers over the
years emphasize the efficiency and effectiveness of the Navy
Stock Fund as an inventory management tool. Its proven
outstanding history of managing inventories in the hands of
such operating units as ships and support activities is a fact
that should be recognized by today's Navy logistics managers.
The principal reason for the fund's exceptional
success in inventory management is the concept of operation
utilized. In the next chapter, this "revolving fund" concept
is explained and evaluated in detail.
U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Comptrol-
ler, Working Capital Funds of the Department of Defense
,
Annual
report to the Congress for the year ending June 30, 1971




THE NAVY STOCK FUND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
Authority, Purpose, and Concept
The Navy Stock Fund has been used by the Navy since
1893 as a means of financing selected categories of material.
The present fund is operated under the authority contained in
Section 4-05 of the National Security Act of 194-7* as amended,
and Regulations Governing Stock Fund Operations approved by
the Secretary of Defense on January 26, 1967.
Its purpose is "to provide a simplified and effective
means of managing, controlling, financing and accounting for,
through the use of working capital funds, such materials,
supplies and equipment as are identified under Section IV
phereafter.
"
In an attempt to arrive at a common basis of under-
standing, the following definitions of a revolving (working)
fund are offered:
A working capital (revolving) fund used to
finance inventories of stores, supplies and speci-
fied equipment, consisting essentially of material
and cash. The cash portion finances all material
U.S., Department of Defense, "Regulations Governing
Stock Fund Operations," DOD Directive 74-20.1, January 26, 1967
•
2U.S., Department of the Navy, Revised Charter for
Navy Stock Fund




purchases and is reimbursed from appropriated funds
upon issue (sale) of the material to the customer.
1
Working capital corresponds to industry's use of
inventory and various asset accounts to hold resources
in suspense until they are consumed. Within the Depart-
ment of the Navy, the principal working capital devices
are stock funds, which hold material in suspense until
consumption. . . .2
. . . a revolving fund, established to finance
inventories of supplies and other stores, or to provide
working capital for industrial type activities (e.g.,
stock funds, industrial funds).
3
A revolving fund is a fund established to finance
a cycle of operations to which reimbursement and col-
lections are returned for reuse in a manner such as
will maintain the principal of the fund (e.g., working
capital funds, industrial funds, and loan funds). ^
The Department of Defense feels that the reason for
existence of stock funds is to "finance the procurement of
material that upon issue become expenses of the consuming
agency. Generally the items included in the stock funds
consist of supplies, minor items of equipment, and parts and
components used in the manufacture, assembly or repair of
end items of equipment."
Bryan W. Ziegler, "The Navy Stock Fund Cash Position,"
Navy Supply Corps Newsletter , XXX, No. 3 (1967), 8.
p
U.S. ,. Department of the Navy, Financial Management
in the Navy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1969), p. 187.
^U.S. , Department of the Navy, Navy Comptroller
Manual
, Vol. I, Appendix A: Glossary of Terms Used in Comp-
troller Activities (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing








The Navy states that the primary purpose of the Navy
Stock Fund is "simplification of financing, control, and
accounting for the procurement and inventories of materials,
supplies, and equipment." A secondary purpose is: "greater
financial flexibility and improved financial control of con-
sumption of material through budgeting, financing, and
p
accounting for the use of such material at the consumer level."
The stated objectives of the Navy Stock Fund are to
provide
:
(1) Automatic funding for replenishment through
reimbursement for material consumed.
(2) A deterrent to placing obligations other than
when required because of the availability or non-
availability of appropriations.
(3) Protection of Mobilization Reserve stocks for
the use intended by replacement, when diverted through
reimbursement from current appropriations.
(4-) The measurement of budget estimates and costs
of material issued based on consumption rather than
purchase.
3
The operation of a stock fund is the equivalent to a
government-owned purchasing and distributing corporation,
which serves as a "business" for items of supply in the Depart-
ment of Defense logistics operation. Items of supply which are
in demand by consumers—bureaus, offices, and operating forces
—
throughout the major services are purchased and distributed
to pre-determined wholesale or retail locations by stock fund
managers, and ultimately sold to "end-use" customers, who





reimburse the fund from annual appropriations. The "basic
principal of a stock fund operation encompasses a revolving
cycle consisting of procurement, distribution, and withdrawal
in much the same manner as exemplified by Figure 2. With the
credit of the permanent corpus of capital, which was previ-
ously appropriated by Congress, supply items with recurring
demand are purchased and distributed through established
channels of supply to the operating forces of the military
services. Upon the issue of this material from inventory to
using activities, the appropriations granted for "end-use"
functions are charged and the cash capital of the stock fund
reimbursed, thereby generating additional funds for financing
of a subsequent cycle of the fund. Except for the lack of a
profit motive, advertisement, and the requirement to maintain
a readiness position to meet future military emergencies, the
concept is similar to that of any large commercial retailing
enterprise such as Penney 's or Sears, Roebuck and Company.
This supply management concept "represents an effort to provide
room for business management within the framework of a military




of the Navy Stock Fund
As is the case with any management system, considerable
discussion has ensued between the proponents and opponents of
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United





stock funding. Although the statement made in 1920 by
Paymaster-General McGowan in his annual report— "the specific
advantage of the Naval Supply Account . . . and there are no
disadvantages" —may have been biased, it is generally recog-
nized that the Navy Stock Fund's concept of "revolving fund"
has considerable merit. Some of the more important advantages
and beneficial characteristics which this writer has been able
to interpolate from the readings are:
1. Effects common use of inventories, thus reducing
storage space necessary for individual unit backup
stock.
2. Enforces supply discipline through cost conscious-
ness incentives.
3. Facilitates more orderly and timely procurement.
4. Affords flexibility and quick response to customers'
requirements.
5. Establishes a businesslike type of management.
6. Provides a method by which fleet activities with
operational responsibility can be assured of obtain-
ing needed material. With available funds, they
are not dependent on someone else.
7. Economies over a free-issue system are realized
through the requirement to pay for material.
8. Reimbursement from sales automatically provides
funds for stock replenishment.
9. Consolidates operating and fiscal responsibilities
under one management.
10. Improves budgetary control of expenses of operating
activities by requiring funding for consumption of
material.
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Annual Report of the Paymaster-General of the Navy
,
to the Secretary of the Navy, 1920 (Washington, D.C. : Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1920), p. 21.
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11. Permits procurement to continue without interrup-
tion at fiscal year's end.
12. Curtails incentive for fiscal year-end buying sprees.
13. Reduces peacetime operating stocks to a minimum, thus
reducing funds required to provide working stocks of
material.
14. By giving credit, encourages users to return unneeded
items to stock.
15. By use of a standardized stock catalog, all customers
know what material is normally stocked and available
for issue.
16. Permits charging off deterioration or obsolescence
of stocks when it occurs.
17. Lodges charges against proper "end-use" appropri-
ations when material is consumed, not when ordered
(improved costing).
Some of the disadvantages or undesirable character-
istics of this system are:
1. Stock funds require more paper work with greater
administrative costs. (This handicap could be
eliminated with revised accounting criteria and
the use of available computers.)
2. The apportionment controls imposed on stock funds
by the Office of Manpower and Budget (OMB) negate
the revolving nature of the funds to a slight
degree and might eliminate some of the advantages
of a stock fund.
3. Prom lack of consumer funds, military units may not
be able to obtain needed supplies, even though the
required items are on hand in the stock fund. This
is also a problem in all accounting systems except
"free issue.
"
4. If large numbers of "insurance" items or extremely
slow-moving, highly technical material is stocked,
stock obsolescence will impair the solvency of the




5. Loss of Congressional control of purchases as stock
fund purchases material without prior Congressional
review or approval.
6. If high obsolescence factor exists, the surcharges
imposed, for recovery of losses will increase price
of salable items to inefficient point, thus causing
customers to buy elsewhere.
It is realized that these lists of the advantages and
the disadvantages of the Naval Stock Fund method of operation
are not to be considered complete by any means. However, they
do serve the purpose of pointing out that the system has many
more beneficial aspects than drawbacks.
As pointed out by Hitch and McKean, the use of stock
funds is
expected to bring about three kinds of improvement.
First, their managers will be motivated to conduct the
operation more efficiently, because there will be an
appropriate indicator of efficiency to be evaluated by
superior officers; second, customers will be motivated
to find cheaper substitutes or ways of using less of a
product as they will not be able to get material as a
free good; and third, the resources of the consumers
will be put to their most valuable uses. 1
Management and Material Distribution
in the Navy Stock Fund
Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy
and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander,
Naval Supply Systems Command, will manage the Navy
Stock Fund in conformity with DoD Directive 74-20.1,
"Regulations Governing Stock Fund Operations," and such
other policy statements, appropriate regulations and
procedures as may be issued by higher authority. The
Navy Stock Fund, as covered by this charter, excludes
all material financed under the Marine Corps Stock
Fund. 2
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics









As a result of the growing significance of stock fund
operations in all phases of Navy management, the Secretary of
the Navy established the "Navy Stock Fund Board" on Janu-
ary 12, 1956. This "board was charged with the express mission
of "providing integrated Bureau and Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations review and logistics guidance to the Commander,
Naval Supply Systems Command who is the General Manager of the
Navy Stock Fund." 1
In providing supply service under Navy Stock Fund
operations, the Navy employs organization arrangements
resembling those of private distributing enterprises. As
noted above, central management of the fund is exercised by
the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) under
regulations and procedures issued by higher authority.
Activities known as Inventory Control Points (ICP) are
central business management headquarters for particular com-
modity areas of Naval material. The management in each of
the seven Inventory Control Points specializes in related
commodity lines which, in commercial practice, would fre-
quently be the basis of a complete business organization.
For the category of material assigned, each Inventory Control
Point is responsible for requirements determination, procure-
ment, inventory control, distribution, and other related
supply functions on a Navy-wide basis. This responsibility
Department of the Navy, Navy Stock Fund Annual
Report (1958), p. 3.

55
is exercised through the receipt and evaluation of recurrent
stock status and financial status reports which reflect Navy-
wide transactions and inventory position for particular items
and classes of material.
The home offices of most of these concerns are physi-
cally removed from Washington to provide dispersal in case of
an attack on the United States by a potential enemy. Table 2
gives a breakdown of ICP location and of the types of material
managed.
Obligation authority is the primary means of control
utilized for administration of the Navy Stock Fund. It is
allocated to the various inventory managers principally to
provide for necessary replacement of sales. Planned buildup
or draw-down of stocks is the other major determinant of final
allocation. The spread between contractual or obligating
authority actually used and the sales income returned to the
fund is the most significant factor. If the manager of the
stock fund desires to decrease or enlarge the size of the
inventory controlled by a specific Inventory Control Point, he
will accomplish this by reducing or expanding the obligational
authority available to that inventory manager. If the manager
has inadequate funds, he will be unable to replace the material
which he has sold, thus reducing his total inventory.
All material authorized to be purchased by the Navy
Stock Fund will be carried in the Fund at Naval shore
activities on a world-wide basis until sold or issued
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Stock Fund type material positioned in store rooms
afloat may be carried in the Navy Stock Fund.l
Each Inventory Control Point (ICP) designates a few
major activities as distribution points. These are usually
Naval Supply Centers (NSC) or Industrial Naval Air Stations
(INAS) on each coast of the United States. These activities
carry "wholesale stock" for the supply support of designated
continental and extracontinental primary stock points and may
also be assigned supply support responsibility for secondary
stock points in the immediate area and overseas. Fleet units
may draw required material from these activities on a "retail
stock" basis.
The primary stock points, usually Naval Supply Depots
(NSD) or major Naval Air Stations (NAS) support assigned
secondary stock points and consumer activities on a wholesale/
retail basis. The secondary stock points, both ashore and
afloat, support the navy end-user on a strictly retail basis.
These supply activities may be classed in one echelon of supply
for material under the inventory control and one supply demand
control point and at the same time be classed in another
echelon of supply for material under the inventory control of
2
another supply demand control point.
In addition to the stock echelons, all Navy Stock Fund
type material positioned in storerooms onboard the Mobile
Department of the Navy, Revised Charter
, p. 5«
p
U.S., Department of the Navy, The Navy Stock Fund
Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1971 i P« !• (Lithographed. )
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Logistics Support Force, as well as all commissary items,
clothing and small stores, and ship's stores stock onboard
afloat units are carried in the Navy Stock Fund until issued
or purchased for end use.
This system of distribution is extremely flexible
in that an end-user may actually draw material directly from
any echelon of supply. The stores' accounting technique is
such that material may move between any two levels of supply
without regard to intermediate levels; for example, aircraft
squadron storekeepers may draw material directly from a
distribution point.
The Inventory Control Point accomplishes individual
item management of the material located at the distribution
points and primary stock points by means of daily transaction
item reports (TIR). These reports, transmitted to the IGP
by electronic means, itemize all issues, receipts, back-orders,
dues, and so on, which may have transpired at that particular
activity since the last report. This information is utilized
by the ICP for updating his master computer to insure current
stock visibility. An important point to be brought out is
that there is no such line item reporting by secondary stock
points. Therefore, there is loss of visibility of some






The What of the Navy Stock Fund Inventory
Today, seventy-eight years after enactment of the
legislation which established the concept of financing supplies
under a working capital type fund, the Navy Stock Fund bears
little resemblance to its ancestor (the Naval Supply Fund)
except in theory and principle.
The fund has increased from the original $200,000 to
its present level of Si, 759 , 165 , 000, which is down from its
peak inventory of $2,082,023,000 in 1969. 2 Purchasing and
stocking of "ordinary commercial" supplies have been extended
to include material of the most technical nature on today's
market. This expansion has resulted m annual sales for
fiscal year 1971 of $1,74-8.4 million. 4
The Navy Stock Fund consists of a "cash corpus" and
an inventory of material which is known as the Naval Stock
Account (NSA). The Naval Stock Account contains only material
which the Department of Defense classifies as "expense" type
items. The remainder of Navy material (with the exception of
research and development) which is available for use by
consumers but is not carried in the Navy Stock Fund, is






Department of the Navy, Navy Stock Fund Annual







Department of the Navy, Navy Stock Fund Annual
Report (1971), p. 3.
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in Appropriation Purchase Accounts which are funded and managed
by the various systems commands.
The criteria for determining the difference between
"expense" and "investment" material is based on the considera-
tion of the following criteria:
(1) The intrinsic or innate qualities of the item,
such as durability in the case of an investment item,
or consumability in the case of an expense item; and
(2) the conditional circumstances under which an
item is used or the way it is managed.
1
A general definition for these items would be:
Expense item .—An item which is consumed in use on
issue, or one which, although not consumed immediately, does
not warrant the accounting and management effort required
of investment items. These items are also called secondary
items.
Investment item .—An end-item of equipment or repar-
able assembly which is managed centrally for one of the
2
services. These items are also called principal items.
A simple decision diagram for determining whether
an item should be classified as an "investment" item or an
"expense" item is contained in Figure 3«
Expense items are funded by the Navy Stock Fund;
therefore, issues are reimbursable. The consumer or requisi-
tioner must reimburse the stock fund from end-use monies
U.S., Department of Defense, Definitions of Expenses
and Investment Costs , DOD Instruction 7040.5, September 1,













































Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Instruction 70^+0.51 September 1,
1966, including Change 3*
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such as operation and maintenance (C&MN) funds. In recent
years, because of the performance budget push in the Depart-
ment of Defense and because of more accurate costing informa-
tion, there has been a tendency to capitalize APA stocks into
the NSA of the Navy Stock Fund. Figure 4- gives a breakdown
of the major end-use appropriations which purchased material
from the Navy Stock Fund in fiscal year 1971* It is important
to point out that the operation and maintenance appropriation
furnishes 61 per cent of all sales (excluding commissary store
sales, which are paid for by military members and their
dependents in lieu of appropriations granted by Congress).
Another 21 per cent of sales is generated by the industrial
funds which repair Navy equipment and material.
In order for the reader to understand the volume and
salability of the various classifications of material stocked
in the fund, fiscal year 1971 Stock Fund operations have been
summarized in Table 3« Although the stock turn ratio (sales -f
inventory) for the total fund is one to one, there are some
major variations to be found in the specific commodity groups.
For instance, the high sales turn experienced in subsistence,
fuel, commissary stores, and retail material is the result
of two factors: (l) a very high demand by the user activities,
and (2) a relatively short procurement lead time, which allows
for small inventories in relation to sales.
Just the opposite are the technical type materials
managed by Ships, Parts Control Center (SPCC), Aviation Supply
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(Navy and Marine Corps)
Source: U.S. , Department of the Navy, The Navy Stock Fund Annual
Report for Fiscal Year 1971 -
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(Navy and Marine Corps)
Source: U.S. , Department of the Navy, The Navy Stock Fund Annual
Report for Fiscal Year 1971 »
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Office (ASO), and Electronic Supply Office (ESO), which have
a stock turn ratio of approximately once every three years.
This low stock turn is the result of: (l) stocking of low
demand (insurance) items, which are considered necessary in
cases of emergency; (2) long procurement lead time for the
complex, highly sophisticated repair parts; and (3) high rate
of obsolescence because of rapid technological advancement
of equipment supported by these repair parts. In some cases,
an item of equipment has become obsolete and is replaced by
an improved ver ;ion prior to the procurement and delivery of
the related spare parts to the supply system.
One of the criteria of material to be stocked in the
Navy Stock Fund is that the item must have a recurring demand.
It was desired not to tie up funds in frozen assets. This
last criterion is one that contains significant features in
relation to the actual composition of stock funds. It is
important to note that recurring demand is the criterion.
But no mention is made of the time period involved. In actual
composition, there are thousands of items in the NSF which
were acquired as insurance. Many of them are extremely slow
movers, or non-movers which were acquired for their essenti-
ality to military operations, not for their turnover
characteristics.
The problems of frozen assets and high obsolescence
have caused many repercussions in the areas of funding and
budgeting for the Navy Stock Fund. First, the effectiveness
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of any revolving fund inventory is depreciated by the exis-
tence of obsolescence. Second, the cash corpus of a revolving
fund suffers as the result of lost sales reflected by
obsolescence.
In response to these two problems, inventory managers,
under the authority granted by the Department of Defense,
have established a surcharge which is added to the acquisition
price of the item. This surcharge ranges from 1 per cent of
item unit cost for ship's store and commissary stock to 24 per
cent of item unit cost for forms and publications. The
technical material managed by Ships Parts Control Center,
Electronic Supply Office, and Aviation Supply Office has a
surcharge of 20 per cent, 20 per cent, and 17 per cent, respec-
p
tively. This high surcharge on all items carried has the
negative effect of forcing the consumer to buy materials at
a lower price from commercial sources in order to conserve
critical end-use funds. This loss of sales creates another
rise in surcharges because sales are less than the amount the
5 . . .initial surcharge was based on. As is evident, this is a
never-ending circle that requires correction if the fund is
to generate enough sales to insure continuation of the "self-
supporting" concept.
department of Defense, DoD Directive 74-20.1, p. 7.
p
Department of the Navy, Navy Stock Fund Annual
Report (1971), p. 5-
^Preliminary Report of SECNAV Ad Hoc Stock Fund




This chapter delved into the management coi
inventory procedures of the Navy Stock Fund. From this
review, the reader can see that it was intended that the
fund's strict financial control and funding of assets create
a higher degree of cost consciousness at the support base and
user levels. Customers would be required to cite their
appropriated funds for all withdrawals of material which is
carried in the Navy Stock Fund.
Some special management problems that were created
by the inclusion of technical repair parts in the fund were
examined. The problems of stock turn, obsolescence, and
insurance stocks will be discussed in greater detail in later
chapters dealing with stocking objectives and budgeting and
costing criteria.
These difficulties have raised the question: "What is
the proper approach to stocking criteria in order to receive
the most benefits for the amount of dollars expended?" This
question and some proposed solutions to the problems are the
subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
STOCKING OBJECTIVES FOR AERONAUTICAL
MATERIAL
The Need for Inventories
Inventories of physical goods exist in all sectors of
the economy, primarily for the purpose of making goods avail-
able to customers or producers without delay and to increase
sales and profits. For example, an industrial concern must
have raw materials and finished products on hand to avoid
delay in production and to respond quickly to customer demands
for a variety of finished products; a supermarket carries
perishable fruits and vegetables because few customers are
willing to wait for their demands to be filled from a truck
farm; a retail clothing store must have a variety of items to
display in order to attract customers. Although the profit
motive is lacking, military inventory systems carry a diversi-
fied range of goods in sufficient quantity to satisfy the
demands of fleet units without production and transportation
delays.
Since inventories exist, it is natural to try to
classify the types of items carried. Some of the adjectives




finished, hard, soft, technical, and general. Obviously, a
given item might be described by one or more of these terms.
However, two general classifications, namely, consumable and
repairable, characterize any item. A consumable item is one
that is either consumed in use or discarded after wear-out
or failure. Examples of consumable items are nuts, bolts,
paint, fuel, paper products, food, gaskets, resistors, and
rags, to mention only a few. In general, a repairable item
is one that can be repaired after failure or wear and will
subsequently provide some flow of services to the user. Air-
craft, engines, radars, aviation components, and hydraulic
pumps are all examples of repairable items. They can be
repaired by the ship or user, a local maintenance shop, or
the manufacturer. More general terms utilized within the Navy
are organizational (squadron), intermediate (supporting
activity), or depot (Industrial Air Stations) levels of
repair.
A more specific definition of a repairable item is
that it is returned to a major repair point after use, over-
hauled or repaired, put back on the shelf in a ready-for-
issue (RFI) condition, and reissued to a customer to satisfy
a demand. The principal rationale behind designating an item
as repairable is that it is more economical to repair than
discard it.
Consumable and repairable item inventories in the
Naval establishment are worth millions of dollars and require
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extensive management effort. Therefore, once the inventory
has been determined and procured, an effective system for
control and management should be developed. In the military,
prudent management of inventories normally contributes to
increased weapon system effectiveness, decreased inventory
investment, and decreased system costs.
In any system carrying consumable items, a set of
rules for determining how much of an item to buy and when to
buy it, i.e. an operating doctrine, must be established. In
a repairable system, the procurement decision is augmented
by an additional decision of how much and when to repair.
Thus, the basic difference between a consumable and a repair-
able item inventory system is one of repair decisions.
As the repairable items are repaired and returned to
the system in a "ready-for-issue M (HIT) status, they are
normally carried in an Appropriations Purchase Account (APA).
This account does not charge the end-user's funds upon issue.
Consumables are Just the opposite, in that they are expended
from the logistics system as a charge to end-use funds upon
their issue. Since this material is chargeable to end-use
funds upon issue, it is normally carried in the Naval Stock
Account portion of the Navy Stock Fund. Repairable items are
almost never carried in the Naval Stock Account except for a




Since the overwhelming majority of shipboard or air-
craft spare parts are of a consumable nature and as such are
included in the Naval Stock Account, the inventory and stocking
objectives discussed in this chapter will apply principally to
consumable items. However, this is not to say that these
objectives and ideas would not work with equal success on
repairable items.
Determination of Inventory Level
A question that is imposed upon any inventory system
or manager is: "What is the correct inventory which an
activity should carry?"
Probably the most accurate answer that can be given
to this question, at least from a theoretical aspect, is:
"That amount of stock which will insure that there is always
an ample amount, and no more, of material to fill any require-
ment placed upon the supporting activity. " The philosophy
of this definition is that if an item could always be placed
on the inventory shelf the instant prior to a requirement for
that item, there would never be excess inventory or an out-of
stock situation.
If, by some stroke of magic, this situation were
possible, there would be no problems with inventory or stocking,
But in the "real world" of fluctuating demand, limitation of
-*-Dr. Robert Holland, Professor, Department of Manage-
ment Science, The George Washington University, lectures to
the Navy Graduate Financial Management Class, October, 1971.
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such resources as funds, space, time, labor and material,
variable procurement or shipping lead times, and other
unpredictable factors, this situation is an infinite
probability.
The answers that are most often proposed for accom-
plishing the ideal inventory are usually the result of some
form of qualitative analysis, such as cost-benefit comparison,
When cost-benefit ratio analysis is applied in the
determination of the amount of inventory to be carried, that
quantity of stock for which the marginal benefit of having
one additional unit of inventory is equal to the cost of
carrying one additional unit in inventory is considered the
optimum stocking level.
In a commercial enterprise, the costs associated with
determination of inventory quantity are divided into either
the carrying costs or the costs associated with an inadequate
inventory. The carrying costs consist of:
1. Cost of capital tied up in the inventory.
2. Storage costs of the inventory.
5. Depreciation and obsolescence.
4. Insurance and property taxes.
These costs are balanced against the costs associated
with an inadequate inventory, which consist of:
1. Loss of sales (stock-outs).
J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial




2. Loss of customer goodwill.
3. Disruption of production schedules.
It is a proven fact that the carrying costs associated with
inventory rise and fall are nearly proportionate with the rise
p
and fall of the inventory level.
The carrying of materials in inventory is expensive.
In most cases, the annual cost of carrying a production inven-
tory averages approximately 25 per cent of the value of the
inventory.
To assure a fair evaluation of the "right amount of
inventory, " the relationship of the costs associated with an
inadequate inventory to the size of the inventory must be
examined. As would be expected, these costs become smaller as
Zj_
the level of inventory increases. However, these costs
are not proportional to the amount of inventory, as the
carrying costs of inventory are known to be. As an example,
if it is assumed that the value of the amount of additional
inventory required to reduce the "stock-outs" of a firm from
15 per cent to 10 per cent is $1 million, then, to reduce the
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Weston and Brigham, Managerial Finance , p. 469.
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cent would require substantially more funds, perhaps as much
as $10 million to $15 million more. This explanation helps
to explain the earlier statement that the correct level of
inventory is that level at which the cost associated with the
addition of one unit will exceed the benefits achieved by the
amount of that extra unit. A simpler definition of an
economic inventory level is: "That level of inventory where
the combined total costs of carrying the inventory and the
costs associated with an inadequate inventory are least."
Military Method of Determining
Inventory Stocking Level
The military application of cost-benefit analysis of
inventory levels on board combatant ships would be classified
by this writer as minimal, if considered at all. This state-
ment is perhaps only partially true, in that most afloat
inventory stocking levels are based on estimated requirements
over a fixed period of time, which is normally ninety days.
A tremendous premium is placed on the costs of having a
"stock out" as a result of inadequate inventory. Admittedly,
this cost, which in actuality is loss of fleet readiness,
could be extremely expensive at certain times, as in a wartime
combat situation. However, in most cases, especially in
peacetime, few items of inventory would justify the extra-






The major determination of the amount of investment
in inventory, as recognized by most experts, is the level of
sales (demands from a military viewpoint). The demand cri-
terion for Naval shipboard inventories is a period of time,
such as from overhaul to overhaul, or six- to nine-months
deployment. There is little correlation between the operating
tempo of the ship and the depth or range of inventory to be
carried. The age-old military concept of measuring stocks in
so many "weeks of supply, " while suitable for, say, the cavalry
horses' feed, can be most dangerous when applied to spare parts
2for modern ships and aircraft.
The problem of estimating which specific repair parts,
and in what quantity, an aircraft will require while operating
from a supporting activity is extremely difficult, for various
reasons.
First, of the 100,000-odd kinds of parts listed for
a modern aircraft, only about 50 per cent will be used at all
during the life of the aircraft. Second, the demand pattern
for spare parts for the same type of aircraft differs sub-
stantially between activities, because of differences in
location, missions flown, age of the aircraft, and even the
model and series of aircraft. About 10 to 30 per cent of the











and series, so that, if a new aircraft is being phased-in to
the Navy, there is little experience with the demand for many
of its replacement parts.
For the support of Naval aviation, the Navy attempts
to "base its demand data for spare parts on operating information
more than on a specific time period, such as ninety days.
Together with contractor representatives, knowledgeable members
of the Aviation Supply Office and the Naval Air Systems Command
prepare a document referred to as an Initial Outfitting List
(IOL) for all aircraft and their major components. This docu-
ment contains the part number, federal stock number, and
nomenclature for all spare parts which this group feels will
require replacement, and an estimate of the various quantities
thought to be required at various flight-hour levels. In most
cases, this document represents the judgment of personnel who
are supposedly familiar with the equipment. The IOL is
periodically (normally on an annual basis) reviewed and revised
by operating, maintenance, and technical personnel, and hundreds
of items may be added or deleted. Recently, maintenance demand
data (3M reports) provided by the fleets have been used for
2'
this purpose.
How successful is this method of projecting estimated






Ribble, presentation on October 20, 1970,
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aircraft flying hours, while clearly valid for fuel and
lubricants, has serious limitations when applied to spare
1 2parts." Various studies dating from the early sixties to
5the present show that less than one-fourth of the items on
IOL's for different types of aircraft are actually utilized,
Some specifics of these studies are discussed later in this
chapter.
Results of Demand-Usage Studies for
Aeronautical Spares in
Naval Aviation
As indicated in the previous section, there has "been
little success in predicting the future usage rate of aero-
nautical spares. Hopefully, there will be improvement as
better techniques for gathering maintenance data are utilized.
An examination of studies conducted by the Navy in the area
of excess material stocked on aircraft carriers over the last
ten years is necessary.
A study sponsored jointly by the Office of Naval
Research and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and conducted
by The George Washington University in 1962 examined "the
Hitch and McKean, Economics of Defense
, p. 273.
p
Marvin Denicoff and Sheldon Haber, "A Study of Usage
and Program Relationships for Aviation Repair Parts," The
George Washington University Logistics Research Project,
Serial T- 140/62, August 7, 1962.
^Captain E. A. Grinstead, Jr., SC, USN, Assistant
Chief of Staff (Supply), Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, in a presentation to the 25th Annual Aviation Supply




general characteristics of usage at base level of aviation
repair parts and components utilized by the all-weather get
fighter-interceptor F4D-1 aircraft." The usage and engineer-
ing data analyzed and evaluated in this study pertained to
approixmately 125 aircraft over a three-and-a-half-year
period.
Some of the more important findings of this study
were
:
1. Of a total number of 1777 I4D-1 maintenance
usage parts, only 59 parts, or 3 percent of the parts
examined, were correlated with flying hours.
2. Most repair items are not demanded at all.
Sixty-seven percent of the installed parts and 64 per-
cent of the components had no demand Navy-wide for the
entire forty-two month period.
3
5. The quantity of an item demanded by squadrons
in a month is extremely low. The monthly demand was
one in 45 percent of the parts requirements and 73 per-
cent of the component requirements.^
4. A small number of repair items account for the
bulk of the quantity of units demanded. Approximately
six percent of the parts accounted for 80 percent of
the total quantity of parts demanded over the entire
period.
5
These results have been duplicated by numerous studies
6
conducted in 1964 for various types of aircraft (A4D Jet













Sheldon Haber, "A Comparison of Usage Data Among
Aircraft Types," The George Washington University Logistics
Research Project, Serial T-174/64, September 1, 1964.
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and F4-D jet fighter), and in 1965 for the F4B, A6A, and CH4-6A
aircraft. A somewhat similar situation in relation to low
demand for consumable spare parts (bits and pieces) required
for the repair of aeronautical components was discovered in a
study conducted for the Department of the Navy by the Planning
Research Corporation (PRO) in 1968.
For informational purposes, a detailed study of
demands placed on afloat inventories of shipboard repair parts
in 1963-1964 made by Clifford Miller, of the Bureau of the
Budget, revealed that the demands for material by shipboard
users during the period from overhaul to overhaul (approxi-
mately three and a half years) was less than 15 per cent of
4the line items carried.
Because the information contained in the above studies
may be out of date, no further emphasis is placed upon them
except to apprise the reader that the problem is not a new
one but has been documented by the Navy almost from the
beginning of aviation support.
W. J. Howard, R. G. Herrmann, and G. R. Hollington,
"Evaluation of Optimum Allocation Program for Aircraft Spare
Parts," Technical Military Planning Operation, General Elec-
tric Company, Santa Barbara, California, Serial control number
65TMP-58, September 30, 1965-
p
Planning Research Corporation, "Bit and Piece Support
of Aircraft Repairables Project," Prepared for the Department
of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Control No. PRC
R-1135, May, 1968.
^Clifford J. Miller, Bureau of the Budget, m a memo-
randum for Mr. Veatch, Bureau of the Budget, regarding Material





The problem of stocking aeronautical repair parts
aboard aircraft carriers in excessive quantities is still a
major problem, as indicated by a recent presentation of problem
areas at an Aviation Supply Officers' Conference. The Force
Supply Officer for Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet
(COMNAVAIRLANT) pointed out that of the approximately 49,000
line items of Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL)
carried on board one Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier, only 6,752
items experienced any demand during a deployment. This is a
demand-usage rate of a mere 14 per cent of total AVCAL items
carried. Another problem, which is related to the estimated
usage figures, is that of the 6,752 line items which experi-
enced demand, material was "not-in-stock" (NIS) 3,509 of the
2 . .times it was requested, indicating insufficient quantities
were being stocked. A more serious problem, in this writer's
estimation, is that 6,819 line items which were demanded were
not carried or allowed in the stocking criteria of the Initial
Outfitting Lists. This figure shows that for every item
carried for which there was demand, one item was requested
but not carried: 6819 + 6752 = 1.01.
These statistics are not peculiar to one aircraft
carrier in the Atlantic Fleet, but to Pacific Fleet carriers
as well. This fact is substantiated by statistics furnished





by the Aviation Supply Office's analysis of five Pacific
Fleet carriers' demand history for a nine-month deployment.
These five carriers supported identical aircraft, except for
the series. Of the total of 141,735 line items carried aboard
the five ships (most items are duplicated on each ship), those
experiencing demand on any or all ships were 35,595, or less
than 25 per cent. Of these total demands, only 205 items
(.14 per cent) were experienced by all five ships, 951 items
(.67 per cent) were experienced by four ships, 2,668 items
(1.88 per cent) by three ships, 6,780 items (4.7 per cent) by
o
two ships, and 24,981 items (17*7 I>er cent) by one ship.
If the extraordinary demand for the one ship is disregarded as
not being representative, then the total line items which
experienced any demand on one ship is 6,780, or less than
5 per cent of the total of 141,735 line items carried.
What do these figures imply for inventory management
of aeronautical spare parts carried on board Naval aircraft
carriers? Assuming that the non-demand items have the same
unit value as the demand items, it would appear that from
75 to 95 per cent of the funds allocated for afloat AVCAL
CDR R. L. Brunson, SC, USN, Director, Allowance Control
Division, Aviation Supply Office, in a presentation to the
24th Annual Aviation Supply Officers' Conference, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, on October 29, 1969.
2Ibid.
This writer realizes that this assumption is possibly
incorrect, but it is used because there are no statistics in




inventories are tied up in dead stock (non-movers) which will
will not be sold but be destined for disposal upon the intro-
duction of a replacement aircraft into the fleet. A review of
the amount of aviation material disposed of by the Navy in
recent years (Table 4-) would tend to authenticate the validity
of this statement.
If the above quoted usage figures are utilized, between
$17,150,000 and $21,850,000 of the inventory of $23 million per
aircraft carrier consists of non-moving material. When this
dollar figure is multiplied by the seventeen aircraft carriers
2presently operating m the Navy, the magnitude of the apparent
waste of "end-use" Operation and Maintenance funds can be
visualized. Under the present system of financing AVCAL and
shipboard inventories from end-use funds, this loss decreases
the dollars available for more urgent requirements of opera-
tional training. The tremendous effect which the present
system of inventory management creates on operational funds is
attested to by the millions of dollars worth of excess material
turned into shore (MTIS), without credit, by Atlantic Fleet
carriers each year.
1Ribble, Presentation on October 20, 1970.
p
U.S., Department of Defense, Department of Defense
Budget for Fiscal Year 1972 (Washington, D.C. : Government
Printing Office, 1971 ).
^Personal interview with Commander M. E. Anglim, SC,
USN, Afloat Budget Officer on Commander Naval Air Forces,




ANNUAL DISPOSAL OF AERONAUTICAL MATERIAL





Total of Total Value Percentage
Inventory of Material _





1966 Not Avail 602 95 . . 6.3:1
1967 Not Avail 603 9^ • • 6.4:1
1968 Not Avail 480 162 • • 4.0:1
1969 1,702 320 251 Ik.
7
2.1:1
1970 1,793 750 279 15.8 2.7:1
Source: U.S., Department of the Navy, Aviation Supply Of fice /'Manage-





How can the problems discussed in the previous section
be either minimized or totally eliminated?
This writer believes that a revision of the provision-
ing procedure at the system level plus an inventory stocking
objective based on generated sales will partially, if not
totally, alleviate the stated problem.
The quantity of each repair part to support an
item of equipment for a given period of operation
is vital basic knowledge that must be computed into
total requirements determination.!
The provisioning process should be based on recorded
maintenance demand data collected by the Naval Aviation
Maintenance and Material Management (3M) system. These data
should be analyzed and compared with the requirements data
available at the Aviation Supply Office. The items that show
low usage and/or designated insurance items should be stocked
only at predetermined system stock points, and in very small
quantities. When this material is required by an operating
unit, its requisition and delivery will be expedited to the
greatest extent possible.
For a new aircraft introduced into the fleet, usage
data would be limited. This deficiency could be alleviated
by requiring the contractor to provide the basic support for
the aircraft until firm requirements data had been developed
and adequate spare parts were available in the supply system.




It is recognized that contractor support for this period of
time would be extremely expensive. However, the choice
between this expense and the expense of procuring millions of
dollars worth of "unsalable" spare parts or of failure to have
operational aircraft would appear to be positively in favor
of purchasing contractor support.
Some criterion other than flight hours should be
utilized for the IOL in the determination of depth of stock.
This writer feels that using the "number of aircraft sup-
ported" as the criterion may have promise. This is an area
where additional study may create positive results.
The supporting aircraft carrier should carry only those
items known to be "sure movers," as shown by maintenance data
and Aviation Supply Office records. In order to control the
depth and range of material stocked, the afloat inventory
should be carried under the Navy Stock Fund inventory manage-
ment system. This system requires the generation of sales
before obligational authority can be made available for
increased procurement of stock. Under this system, if material
is not "selling," there are no funds, and no requirement, for
the ordering of more material.
This writer hypothesizes that implementation of the
Navy Stock Fund inventory management system on Naval aircraft
carriers would result in a substantial savings in financial
resources required for maintaining inventory by a significant
reduction of afloat inventories. Maintaining reduced
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inventories would require fewer personnel and less storage
space at the shipboard level, and at the system level by
reducing back-up stock. The Stock Fund Accounting and
Inventory Management System conceivably would be mechanized
and thus cause no increase in work load at the shipboard
level.
This proposed system would effect savings of opera-
tion and maintenance funds, as charges would be made only
when material is consumed, vice when ordered. The material
delivery lead time, or "pipeline," would be funded by the
Navy Stock Fund, vice the present method of end-use funds.
Under this system, the costs of obsolescence would be negli-
gible because the majority of the stock would be sold. The
small amount not sold would be returned to the system at no
cost to the fund or the user, as it would only be physically
relocated and would not be financially affected when
transferred ashore.
In order for a system such as that proposed to prove
effective, it would be necessary to improve the system's
reaction time. The quantities of repair parts that should be
stocked at a maintenance site are relative to the reaction
time of the off-ship supplier. A competent supply system
permits the user to reduce his inventory levels and thus the
funds tied up in on-board inventory of maintenance material.
The cost and duration of the requisitioning cycle
—
which starts with a requisition and ends with the receipt of
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the material—is one factor in the determination of what parts
to stock at supporting activities.
A method of reducing the period an aircraft is
inoperable due to lack of parts, other than increasing range
and depth of stock, is to reduce the length of the requisition-
ing cycle. This cycle can be reduced by shortening the time
required to communicate the requirement or the time required
2to transport the material. Fortunately, systems are presently
available to aircraft carriers to reduce the time required for
both of these functions.
The most promising opportunities for improving the
communication process aboard afloat ships is the utilization
of Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). This system elec-
tronically transmits punched card or magnetic tape information
to the supporting supply system in minutes (as compared with
days for a paper requisition to travel from ship to shore.)
An additional benefit of this system is an easy method of
transaction item reporting, to the Inventory Control Point,
of all stocks carried in inventory and the accepting of
requisitions to be filled from the Inventory Control Point.
The improvements in the Carrier on Delivery (COD)
service to aircraft carriers have made it possible to deliver








5Charles Luddeke, "Say It with AUTODIN, " Navy Supply
Corps Newsletter
,
XXVIII, No. 7 (1965), 38.
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aircraft carrier from as far away as 1,200 miles in only a
matter of hours. The increased utilization of this system
by the Navy should permit a big step toward lower stocking
levels on shipboard inventories.
The effectiveness and feasibility of extending this
system to support ships has already been demonstrated by its
utilization on submarine and destroyer tenders, fleet repair
ships, and fleet logistics ships for the past few years.
There may be some critics who would question this writer's
implication that an aircraft carrier is a support ship. This
implication is based upon an analysis of its function and its
relation to attached squadrons. Its function is to transport
aircraft to a point within range of a target; to supply and
resupply these aircraft with fuel and ammunition; and perhaps
to repair them, as has been done and could be done again if
the need arose. The aircraft squadrons attached to a carrier
are separate entities of the Navy, with their own commanding
officers and organization. True, the carrier has to be pre-
pared to avoid or evade damage if it is attacked and to fight
back with whatever weapons it carries if an enemy ship or
aircraft should come within range; but so does an oil tanker,
or a transport, or a reefer. These ships do not exist to
avoid damage or to fight, but they have the inherent need,
as does every individual, of self-defense.
1LCDR Donald G. Ray and LCDR Billy G. Smith, "CVA
Aviation Supply Support in WESTPAC, " Navy Supply Corps News-
letter, XXIV, No. 2 (1971), 74.
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A recent study of the logistics systems in the
Department of Defense indicates that certain functions will
be mandatory if the inventory m.-aiager of the near future is
to perform his job in an adequate manner. Among these are:
1. ... a gradual separation of asset ownership
and physical control. Future operational commanders
will continue to control, move and use their assigned
resources as combat conditions dictate, but overall
ownership of distribution system stock should be vested
in someone other than the operator such as rear echelon
management points.
2. [Tomorrow's inventory manager should have] . . .
worldwide knowledge of inventories from the point of
production to the point of consumption by the end
user. . . .
The extension of the Navy Stock Fund inventory
management system to afloat inventories and the implementa-
tion of transaction item reporting (TIR) would be a major
step toward fulfillment of these requirements.
Summary
This chapter has discussed the problems of excess
stock which exists in the Naval logistics system, with
specific attention devoted to excess aeronautical spare parts
onboard aircraft carriers.
The importance of the correction of this problem was
emphasized by a previous commanding officer of the Aviation
Supply Office:
U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), Logistics






The major portion of our Naval Aeronautical supply-
effort is devoted directly or indirectly to the
support of aircraft carriers. The embarked Carrier
Air Wing (GAG) on the carrier is the primary Navy
weapon. All of our sophisticated inventory manage-
ment procedures ashore are in vain if we do not
produce a stocking criteria that will place the right
material on a supply officer's shelf on a deployed
carrier at the right time and at the right place.
1
Various methods of determining the proper stocking
level were discussed, and a revision to the present inventory
afloat system was recommended. This system, if adopted,
should effect savings in material, personnel, and financial
resources.
In addition to the substantial savings which should
result from the implementation of the Navy Stock Fund
inventory management system onboard Naval aircraft carriers,
it is envisioned that numerous management incentives would
accrue to the shipboard personnel associated with inventory
management afloat. These management incentives are the
subject of the following chapter.
1RADM Howard P. Kuehl, SC, USN, Commanding Officer,
Aviation Supply Office, in Closing Remarks to the 20th




MOTIVATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT BENEFITS TO BE
REALIZED UNDER THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
This chapter is designed to point out the problems
and obstacles to motivation which are faced by the shipboard
inventory manager in the afloat Navy today. Management
concepts are presented and discussed that, if implemented,
will help to eliminate many of these problems and create an
environment which will allow for increased motivation and
efficiency.
Current Problems in Management
of Fleet Inventories
Some of the major problems now existing in inventory
management aboard Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers were pointed
out by the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet
(COMNAVAIRLANT) Force Supply Officer's comments in a recent
presentation
:
. . . the Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) and Not
Fully Equipped (NFE) aircraft situation has continued to
worsen for three years. ... A significant problem is
related to the inability to locate material on board.
. . . One of the primary deficiencies found aboard
COMNAVAIRLANT ships was the extremely low validity of
stock and location records. We estimate about 50%
validity conditions when considering all types of errors.
. . . The sheer volume of work and requisitions have




data . . . poor performance in our mechanized environ-
ment has been a major contributor to the carrier's
problems. . . . The volume of NORS and NFE outstanding
requisitions poses an almost unmanageable situation
for the carrier. . . . The validity of inventory and
location records are so poor that the situation has
become a serious challenge to our professional
reputation. . . .1
These selected comments concerning the shipboard supply
management problems of C01MAVAIRLANT ships are indicative of
the general shipboard problems throughout the major combatant
ships of the Navy. The supply officer's function appears to
have become the repeated extinguishing of brush fires, rather
than the more systematic task of fire prevention.
What are the causes of this situation? The answers
to this question are numerous and varied, depending upon who
is asked the question. Some will say that inaccuracy of stock
records is caused by the high tempo of operations, such as
"the delivery of receipts in large volume lots, particularly
2just prior to— and during—at sea periods." As this material
must be "struck below" into the storerooms in an expeditious
manner in order to "clear the deck" for operation of aircraft,
the expected result is paperwork chaos between receipt of the
material and posting of the receipts to the records. Another
factor which has been offered as a cause of this problem is
"a decreasing sense of responsibility for and awareness of our




end product or mission ... a national trend (Navy included)
toward 'worker indifference. '
"
This writer feels that the primary cause of poor
stock record validity is the excess quantity of stores that
the shipboard manager is required to manage with his given
resources of personnel and space, which was previously discussed
in Chapter IV. Many of the eighty to ninety storerooms on an
2
aircraft carrier are remote and not readily accessible. This
inaccessibility fosters storing and issuing problems that in
many cases may seem insurmountable to the young storekeepers
that have been tasked with this unglamorous function. The
resultant motivation problem was highlighted by the Commander,
Naval Supply Systems Command, who stated:
In the eyes of some people, logistics and logistic
support is not a glamorous profession. . . . Much of
what we do tends to become routine and repetitive
. . . the logistician all too often goes unrewarded.
Unchallenged, this negative reaction is a barrier
to the recruitment of top people and a poorly managed
logistics operation fosters what the author considers
to be the top problem in the logistics field: proper
motivation of our people, motivation to learn logistic
support, and to stay in it long enough to make a
meaningful contribution.
3
1RADM Paul F. Cosgrove, Jr., SC, USN, Deputy Com-
mander for Supply Operations and Fleet Support, Naval Supply
Systems Command, in a presentation to the U.S. Naval Supply
Conference held in Annapolis, Maryland, April 22-24, 1968.
2Grinstead, Presentation on October 21, 1970.
^RADM Kenneth R. Wheeler, SC, USN, Commander, Naval
Supply Systems Command, "Human Aspects of Logistics Manage-




It must be stressed, however, that actual performance
can only be facilitated by the system used. The abilities
and motivation of the manager and his personnel constitute
the major determinant of ultimate performance.
Motivation of the Manager
Successful plans for improvement in industry or
government normally are based on some form of cost-reduction
or cost-sharing. Recently, a new aspect, called participation,
has been added, which helps to bring about profound changes
in organizational relationships, attitudes, and practices.
Good managers are a scarce commodity and most
all managers need some form of motivation.
2
One form of motivation for the Navy manager is the
probability of promotion which results from the fitness
reports that are submitted by his senior officer. But,
perhaps a more lasting and self-satisfying motivation would
be his ability to control and manage better the job he is
tasked with.
An apparent answer to the problems of morale and
management would be increased motivation on the part of the
people involved. A major motivation factor would be a
reduction in the size of the inventory to a manageable level,
as discussed in the previous chapter on stocking objectives.
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., I960), p. 110.
o
Peter F. Drucker, Managing for Results (New York:
Harper & Row, Publisher, 1964), p. $.
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Along with this reduction of inventory, there should be
developed a system of management which can be utilized to
evaluate the manager. One of the best known evaluations of
a manager's performance is his ability "to seek the optimum
relationships between inputs and outputs." The optimum
situation which all managers should strive for is "that
combination of resources, out of all known combinations, that
2
will produce the desired output at the lowest cost."
A more general evaluation of a manager's performance
would "be Judged by the contribution which he makes to the
'well-off-ness ' of the firm within the limits imposed on him
by higher authority.
"
The present system of funding shipboard inventories
by means of appropriated funds does not provide a true
measurement of input as the manager has little or no control
over the amount of funds distributed to him for stocking of
inventory. He is granted a set amount of dollars and is
expected to spend the total amount and no more in the per-
formance of his task. The inventory which he is required to
stock is prescribed by persons who are in most cases not in
his chain of command for operational performance. Since the
Robert N. Anthony, John Dearden, and Richard F.
Vancil, Management Control Systems: Cases and Readings





David Solomons, Divisional Performance, Measurement





funds allotted and the stocking criteria for his on-board
inventory of spare parts are not determined or influenced
(except to a limited degree) by the local manager, his feeling
of participative management is minimal.
Under the proposed afloat inventory management system
(Navy Stock Fund), the shipboard supply officer and his men
have the responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the
supply system while at the same time meeting fleet requirements
in the most efficient manner possible. Although the Commander,
Naval Supply Systems Command is directly responsible for stock
fund management and policy formulation in the areas of finan-
cial and inventory control, guidance is provided in such a
manner as to give the local manager maximum flexibility in
meeting his obligations as well as operational commitments.
When the complexities of determining local policy for
stocking, replenishment, material availability, and material
turned into stores (MTIS), as well as the variances of demand
and lead time that are due to geographic location or specific
mission, are considered, it is readily evident that the
inventory manager's task is massive. In most cases, his
responsibility compares to or exceeds that of middle manage-
ment in the business world of civilian enterprise.
The supply officer aboard ship is faced with interpre-
tation and perpetuation of the basic philosophy of inventory
Department of the Navy, Navy Stock Fund Annual
Report (1971), p. 1.
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control. Proper management of inventories, regardless of the
magnitude, is a problem which most people face on a daily
basis, be they housewife or industrial executive. To manage
an inventory properly, the manager must be able to predict
what the consumers will require and when this material needs
to be available for utilization. Assuming that there were
no such constraints as storage space, funds, or availability
of material, it would be feasible for the inventory manager
to stock a ten-year supply of all possible material that the
consumers might require.
Unfortunately, however, or perhaps fortunately,
"resources are always limited in comparison with our wants,
always constraining our actions. If they did not, we could
do everything, and there would be no problem of choosing
preferred courses of action. " As a consequence of resource
limitation or constraint, managers strive to achieve the most
desirable output possible within these constraints. If there
were but a few line items to be managed, instinct and judgment
would normally suffice. However, the number and complexity
of the items to be managed preclude the use of instinct in
the pursuit of the manager's assigned task, but they do not
preclude the use of good judgment, in addition to other
management tools.
In order to reach the point of "maximum output," the
inventory manager must develop a management system which will
Hitch and McKean, Economics of Defense, p. 23.
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attempt to obtain an acceptable "trade-off" between the invest-
ment in inventory and operational efficiency; i.e., maximum
consumer support at minimum work load and inventory investment
levels. This system must also provide the manager with a
procedure for deciding what material requires replenishment
and how much should be procured.
The Wavy Stock Fund concept of "charging the consumer
only at the time of consumption" provides the method of
determining what and how much to replenish. From the standpoint
of the inventory manager, reimbursements for sales of material
provide the means for replenishment of stocks. Dependence on
reimbursements from sales requires inventory managers to do a
good Job of forecasting sales; maintaining adequate, balanced
stocks for sale; effecting timely and orderly procurement; and
avoiding dead stocks.
The manager will replenish only the material that is
being issued to his customers for consumption. If the con-
sumer does not place a requirement on the inventory manager
for certain material, it shows poor judgment to order an
additional amount of a "non-mover." An obvious exception
would be that a consumer had advised the manager of a pro-
jected demand for an item at some point of time in the future.
The deciding factor for determination of the quantity to
procure is the amount of sales generated. Since the manager's
new obligational authority is based on the dollar amount of
sales during the preceding reporting period, funds become the
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limiting factor, or constraint. If a manager desires to order
a larger quantity of a given item, he must improve sales. He
must buy smaller quantities of those items for which there
is less demand.
Allowing the manager the authority and responsibility
for determining what he will carry in inventory (within
certain general constraints) provides one of the key elements
of a control system: "A manager must have responsibility and
authority over the areas in which his performance is
measured.
"
In a discussion of the motivational effect that would
be gained by extending the stock fund management concept to
cover all items of material used by the operating activities,
Dr. Anthony, Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1965 to 1968,
stated:
The system should motivate managers to be more concerned
about the use of resources. Of course, efficiency is
only one criterion for judging a manager, and attention
to efficiency must never be permitted to overshadow the
criterion of effectiveness, which means getting the job
done, and done well. But managers need to know how
efficiently their subordinates are performing their
assigned missions, and the new system will help them
learn this. It should, moreover, motivate managers to
be more concerned with the wise use of resources, and
therefore lessen the need for exhortation, inspection,
specified constraints, and other devices that are now
used as a substitute for a built-in motivation.
2
Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 3^.
pRobert N. Anthony, "Closing the Loop," in Perspec-
tives in Defense Management (Washington, D.C.: Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, November, 1967), p. 6.
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Improved Costing Definition for
Operating Activities
The present method of costing applied to consuming
activities does not accurately measure the costs of materials
consumed in the operation and maintenance of Naval ships and
aircraft. Under this system, the cost of material is lodged
with the consumer when a material requirement is placed upon
the logistics system. No allowance is made for the actual
time of consumption. Because of such costs as funding of
pipeline, unused inventory, and erroneous orders, this proce-
dure tends to inflate the actual costs that are recorded as
operating costs for a particular weapon system.
In order to collect the actual costs of operating a
weapon system, it is necessary for the Navy to develop an
accrual accounting system for fleet funding. The necessity
for accrual accounting was pointed out by the Second Hoover
Commission, whose recommendation number fourteen states:
That Government accounts be kept on the accrual
basis to show currently, completely, and clearly all
resources and liabilities, and the costs of operation.
Furthermore, agency budgeting and financial reporting
should be developed from such accrual accounting.^
The Commission further chastised the appropriation-
allotment system as a method of controlling costs by declaring
U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptrol-
ler, Financial Management of Resources (Operating Forces)
NAVSO P-3013, August 1, 1970, p. 4-12.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Budget and Accounting (1955), p. 38.
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The allotment system in itself does not usually provide
management with the financial information required for
measuring the efficiency and economy with which funds
are used
. . . the allotment system" places emphasis on
the ability to live within allotment rather than the
usual management criterion of performance in terms of
cost. Another defect in the allotment system is the
inherent incentive to spend all allotted funds in order
to support succeeding allotment requests.
1
The Commission felt that accounting and reporting
systems must be responsive to the needs of management. This
requires that they be designed to show the results of opera-
ptions as they apply to organizational units. Accounting
which is limited to accounting for obligations and expenditures
does not fulfill these requirements. These objectives can be
met only if the accounting systems are maintained on an accrual
basis. '
In a continuing effort to develop an accurate costing
system that would separate consumption costs from inventory
costs, Dr. Anthony, Comptroller of the Department of Defense
in the mid-1960 ' s, stated:
In the last 15 years, the military establishment
has come a long way in making this separation between
the costs of current consumption and inventory costs.
The increasing use of stock funds and the purification
of the operation and maintenance appropriations are
examples. -But the surprising fact to an outside
observer is that the DOD has not gone the whole way
... it seems to me that great value would be gained
by holding most (other than certain weapons and their
spares) items in stock funds and not charging them to







p. 69. ^Ibid .
Ll
R. N. Anthony, "New Frontiers in Financial Manage-
ment," Navy Comptroller Review , IX, No. 3 (September, 1962), 9
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Expanding on the concept of the stock fund as a
suspense account mechanism for collecting expenses, Anthony
felt that the use of working capital funds would be extended,
as evidenced by the following statement
:
The function of working capital is to hold assets
in suspense from the time they are acquired until the
time they are used by the final consumer, and we use
working capital for this purpose currently; that is,
we hold many items in stock funds . . . Stock Funds
will be extended to include all consumable material,
both wholesale and retail.
^
The Department of Defense, upon implementing "PRIME"
in July, 1967, pointed out the necessity for expense account-
ing which would "charge measurable expenses to the programs
and organizational units that incur them at the time the
expenses are incurred. " In order to assure that this system
would work, four "major changes" in accounting procedures were
made. One of these is relevant to this paper; it is stated
as follows:
Working capital funds, which hold assets in suspense
from the time they are ordered until they are received
by the final user, are being extended, so that operating
expense accounts reflect only the expense of items con-
sumed, and not the cost of items acquired but not yet
consumed. Working capital accounts are being estab-
lished for locally procured contractual services.
5
R. N. Anthony, "What's Ahead," Armed Forces Manage-
ment
,
XIII, Wo. 1 (October, 1966), 6.
p
U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Comptrol-
ler, Defense Resource Management Systems: Project PRIME







These examples give the reader an insight into how
the Department of Defense feels about the benefits to be
achieved by extending the stock fund concept to the lowest
possible echelon of support, such as naval vessels. For
various reasons, the Navy has deemed it necessary to forestall
implementation of the accrual accounting concept to fleet
accounting, as directed by the Secretary of Defense in March,
1968. However, in this writer's opinion, doing so has become
a greater struggle each year, and fleet accounting will
probably succumb to accrual methods within the next few years.
This opinion is substantiated by an interpretation to this
effect of some impromptu remarks that were made by a policy-
p
making member of the Supply Systems Command in July, 1971.
Summary
The discussion in this chapter has pointed out
some of the present management problems faced by shipboard
supply officers in their function as inventory managers.
The motivational aspects that must be present to induce
people to perform to their maximum cannot be overemphasized.
The importance, of people is conveyed by the question: "Where
else could you get a computer that can carry itself around
U.S., Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense,
Memorandum for Secretaries of Military Departments and
Directors of Defense Agencies, March 3, 1968.
pInterview with a member of the Policy Making Board
of the Naval Supply Systems Command, who wishes to remain
anonymous, July 27, 1971.
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where you need it, that weighs no more than 160 pounds and
can be produced in mass quantities by young unskilled labor?"
Within this chapter a revised system for shipboard
inventory management was proposed. The proposed procedure
of managing shipboard inventories under the Navy Stock Fund
concept emphasized not only the management benefits to be
derived by the supply officer and his men, but also the more
accurate costing and budgeting information that would be avail-
able under the proposed system as envisioned by the Department
of Defense.
Realizing that the major argument against stock
funding of afloat inventories on board combatant ships is
the fear of reduced operational readiness of the fleet, the
subsequent chapter will analyze and examine the effect, if




EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM ON
OPERATIONAL READINESS
The Influence of Logistics on Fleet Readiness
Military doctrine, in "broad terms, can be said to
have three tangible components: the weapon system, the
supply system (logistics), and manpower. In this concept,
the weapon system is considered a dependent variable, and
the remaining two variables are independent.
When logistic support is insufficient, weapon systems
are ineffective, and military actions are lost or victories
delayed. An example of this was in late 1944, when the
Allies seemed on the verge of driving into Germany to ultimate
victory, but Generals Bradley and Patton's offensive drives
were halted by lack of gasoline and ammunition. .For over two
months, their operational plans were constrained by specific
• . • 2
supply limitations.
The decisive factor that logistical support can have
on the outcome of a military conflict is attested to by the
E. L. Katzenbach, Jr. , The Guerrilla and How to Fight
Him (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963), p. 12.
p
Roland G. Ruppenthal, "Logistic Support of Armies,"
The U.S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of





following statement by Japanese General Tojo, who, shortly
before his death, told General Douglas MacArthur that one of
the principal factors that defeated Japan was the ability of
the United States carrier forces to operate for long times
away from their home bases.
As pointed out in earlier chapters, the modern air-
craft weapon system is one of the most complex pieces of
equipment in history. These complex technical systems of
today have had the effect "of reducing the capability of the
combat forces for self-maintenance and increased the
2dependence upon the logistic organization."
Charles Hitch, the great military strategist, points
out that the national security of our country depends on a
military force which has the capability to fight two separate
types of wars: all-out thermonuclear war and limited local
conflicts. y
Since "an all out thermonuclear war involving nations
like the United States and the Soviet Union could easily
destroy either or both in a matter of days or even hours,"
the capability of this method of warfare is generally
1RADM H. J. Foley, Jr., SC, USN, Commanding Officer,
Aviation Supply Office, "The Supply Corps and Naval Aviation
Support," Navy Supply Corps Newsletter , XXXIV, No. 2 (1971),
128.
p
Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense
(Harrisburg, Pa. : The Military Service Publishing Company,
1959), p. 505.
"Ibid.




recognized as a deterrent from attack or possibly for use in
retaliation after attack. It is more likely that this
nation's military forces will become involved in limited con-
flicts as a result of national political pressure or in
fulfillment of its treaty obligations. As Maxwell Taylor
stated:
The atomic retaliatory force has become the shield
of protection warding off the threat of hostile atomic
attack, while the forces of limited war provide the
flexible sword for parry, reposte, and attack.
2
Where the missile-carrying submarines are designed
primarily for use in a thermonuclear war, the aircraft carrier
is the major weapon system which the Commander-in-Chief relies
on in the event of limited local conflicts. The main emphasis
in modern naval strategy is on flexibility. In the naval
forces, this flexibility is best represented by the Attack
Aircraft Carrier and its embarked airwing of multipurpose
aircraft.
One of the primary missions of the Naval Air Force is
to provide superior power in any part of the world which the
President feels requires it. To be capable of fulfilling
this mission, it is required that the deployed ship and air-
craft not only be in a state of operational readiness, but
also that it be able to launch air strikes or combat the enemy
immediately upon arrival at or enroute to the conflict area.
1Ibid.
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York





The seagoing task force commander of today not only is con-
cerned with ""beans, bullets and black-oil," but he must
expand his logistics management to include the anticipation
of numerous aircraft spares and bits and pieces needed to
keep a technically complex array of machines in readiness.
Measurements of Readiness
The term "operational readiness" is universally
defined as the degree of capability of a military unit to
perform the mission assigned to it. This measurement is
obtained by the evaluation of different standards depending
upon the particular section of readiness being measured. A
personnel manager would evaluate the quantity and quality of
the personnel available against the predetermined standard,
normally required to conduct the task. The readiness of an
aircraft bomber squadron is measured by the number of
aircraft combat-ready.
The measurement of fleet readiness from a logistical
aspect is normally by the number of days' supplies of certain
items on hand against a standard which is predetermined by
p
the fleet commander. This criterion provides a sufficient
measurement for provisions, fuel, or common consumables, but
it is comparable to no standard at all when measuring the
Hitch and McKean, Economics of Defense
,
p. 269.
2 • •Henry E. Eccles, Operational Naval Logistics
,
NAVPERS 10869 (Washington, D.C. : U.S., Bureau of Naval
Personnel, 1968), p. 11.
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stocking level of repair parts, with their random demand
pattern.
The measurement of readiness utilized for this type
of material is "based on a technique of measuring supply-
effectiveness in relation to issues of material to fulfill
a customer's requirement. The motivating determinate would
appear to be that if you can measure performance you can find
ways to improve it and to measure the improvement. This
idea may stem from the lack of communication between opera-
tional commanders and supply personnel. Operational commanders
have been prone to state their material requirement goals in
terms of 100 per cent effectiveness. This type of objective
is meaningless to the supplier, as the laws of probability,
the budget, and, in fact, the nation's economy do not compre-
hend such a Utopian objective. Supply goals should be
definitive in that they may be understood, meaningful to all
involved, and possible of achievement with respect to known
constraints.
Measurement of supply effectiveness in the Navy is
accomplished by a simple ratio of the total number of line
items furnished to the requiring entity to the total number
of line items demanded, expressed as a percentage. Two
measures of supply effectiveness are made at each activity:
(1) the Gross Material Availability Index and (2) the Net
Herbert E. Brose, The Criteria and System for Evalu-
ating Logistics Effectiveness ( Dayton": Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, 1959), p. 7-
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Material Availability Index. The first is a measure of the
supply point performance in furnishing every line item of
standard stock required; this includes many items that are
not stocked at the particular supply point. The second
measure, the measure of net effectiveness, is a measure of
the activity's performance in providing those line items that
are authorized for stocking at that supply point. One differ-
ence between the Navy's method and most methods used in other
services is that the Navy measures the stock point performance
in supplying line items from stock on hand . No matter how
rapidly a requirement is satisfied, it counts against the
supply performance of the stock point if it is not supplied
from stocks held at the time the request is processed.
Mathematically, the Navy measures supply effectiveness as
follows
:
Gross Material Total line items issued from stock X 100
Availability Index Total gross line items requested
Net Material
_ Stocked line items issued from stock X 100
Availability Index Total stocked line items requested
This measurement of effectiveness is an evaluation of
an inventory manager's ability to maintain the stock he is
allowed. However, in order to determine a more accurate evalu-
ation of his performance, it is necessary to consider both the
supply effectivensss and the time it takes him to obtain
material from the system external to his activity.

Ill
Regardless of the supply effectiveness of a support-
ing activity such as an aircraft carrier, the true "criteria
for measurement of the effectiveness of logictic support is
mission readiness." The most widely used measure of mission
readiness is the aircraft NORS (Not-Operationally Ready-Supply)
rate and the NEE2 (Not Fully Equipped) rate.
The mathematical calculation for these rates is made
as follows:
NORS No. of aircraft grounded for lack of parts X 100
Rate Total number of operational aircraft available
The problem arising from this measurement is that it
is normally overstated, since many of the aircraft are flying
their missions while still being classified as NORS. This is
possible for the reason that the requirement for parts was
not canceled when the defective item was repaired, or, as in
many cases, cannibilization of the defective part from another
grounded aircraft has been effected. Since the reporting
custodian does not remove an aircraft from an NORS status
until the required part or parts have been received by the
supply officer, and the maintenance department has been
informed that the item is immediately ready for issue, an
inflated figure results.
Brose, Evaluating Logistics Effectiveness
,
p. 5-
2A NFE measures aircraft which have not been rendered
incapable of flight but which cannot carry out all aspects of
their primary mission because of a parts shortage in support
of equipment not essential to flight.
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The use of the NORS or NEE rate as performance
evaluation criteria sometimes results in the following
disadvantages
:
1. There is a tendency for some supply officers at
base level to pay more attention to keeping the out-of-
commission rates low than to getting the total job done
properly.
2. Inefficient cannibalization of aircraft undergoing
maintenance is sometimes used to establish a good base
record.
3. The desire to establish a good record sometimes
causes supply officers at the base level to "pack-rat" many
items beyond their needs, increasing the repair parts
inventory investment and causing shortages at other points
in the supply system.
Effect of Proposed System on
Supply Effectiveness
What would be the effect on fleet readiness if the
proposed criteria for funding and managing of aviation spares
carried as inventory on board naval aircraft carriers were
implemented?
Before this effect can be accurately and objectively
evaluated, a short description of existing fleet readiness
must be presented. From the viewpoint of one admiral
connected with naval aviation, there has been "a gradual,
yet serious decline in the general attitude toward weapon
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system readiness, and a dangerous loss of that compelling
determination to keep our powder dry, and in proper supply!"
Admiral Yates presented specific examples of the
above statement:
In order to meet minimum flying hour requirements,
the pilots gradually begin to accept less and less
quality. Standards were lowered accordingly, and
further demoralization precipitated a vicious downward
spiral of combat readiness. Frequently, at the end
of a day's flying, the USS John P. Kennedy (CVA-67)
could not launch a single "all up" fighter plane in
the defense of the Sixth Fleet.
2
He further stated that "upon investigation, I found
that indeed, the logistics support, both on the local and
navy-wide level, was unsat."
This senior naval officer feels that "the combination
of buying before flying, unsophisticated provisioning, poor
planning for fleet introduction, and lack of a comprehensive
and formalized system for improvement, have seriously reduced
4
our combat effectiveness and skyrocketed the price." Admiral
Yates' opinion of the readiness condition of our aircraft
carriers is substantiated by the Force Supply Officer,
Commander Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet, who feels that
"the NORS and WFE rate in the Sixth Fleet has continued to
worsen for three straight years.
"
RADM E. P. Yates, USN, Commander, Fleet Air, Whidbey,
in a speech to the 25th Aviation Supply Officers' Conference,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 20, 1970.
2Ibid . ^Ibid . ^Ibid .
^Grinstead, Presentation, on October 21, 1970.
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As can be determined from the statements and
substantiation of the above personnel, the fleet readiness
is in need of improvement at the present time. It would
appear that the present system of managing afloat inventories
has proved inadequate, despite the extensive range and depth
stocked in the Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL)
inventory, at an enormous cost.
This writer feels that the proposed system would
improve fleet readiness through improved stocking in both
range and depth of the items which are experiencing usage
navy-wide, as substantiated by the 3M maintenance data and
the demand history information available within the records
of the Aviation Supply Office. In addition, the deletion of
the procurement requirement for the enormous quantity of
excess material now indicated by the Initial Outfitting
Lists (IOL) would allow increased management and funding of
high-usage material.
In cases where the supporting ship lacks the operation
and maintenance funds to procure the full range and depth
under the present system, the stock fund system would be
capable of stocking the required material in a readiness
status without tying up the operator's "in-use" funds. If
the system manager felt that it was necessary to stock certain
"insurance" items despite the lack of usage data, these
relatively few items of stock could be exempted from the




When fleet readiness is measured on the basis of
supply effectiveness, as defined earlier, there should be
minimal reduction in effectiveness due to the inventory
reduction resulting from the implementation of the Navy Stock
Fund inventory management system on board aircraft carriers.
The reasoning behind this opinion is that if no demands are
being placed for the excess material stocked, as verified
by the studies discussed in the previous chapter on stocking
objectives, there can be no loss of supply effectiveness.
This theory is substantiated by a short review of
the supply effectiveness rate before and after the recent
(^6^) implementation of the Fleet Logistics Support Improve-
ment Program (FLSIP) to shipboard spare parts inventories.
Basically, this program utilizes 3M maintenance data for
determining the range and depth of ships' repair parts to
be carried in the afloat inventory. This system has had the
effect of "reducing the range and depth of allowed repair
parts in support of fleet units without decreasing
readiness.
"
The reduction in number of repair parts carried
under FLSIP is the result of carrying only those insurance
items that are vital to the support of the equipment that
is essential to the primary mission of the ship, or to the
1CLR T. A. Biddison, SC, USN, "Your Equipment
Support Allowance," Navy Supply Corps Newsletter , XXXII,






crew's safety or welfare, and those that have a 15 per cent
or greater probability of usage aboard ship in a one-year
period. In addition to these "insurance" items, only those
"demand-based" items (those items which experience one or more
shipboard demand during a ninety-day period) are stocked
which will provide a minimum of 90 per cent probability of
filling the total combat demands for these items over the
entire ninety-day operating period, or, conversely, no more
pthan a 10 per cent risk of stock-out is acceptable.
The results of this implementation are extremely
enlightening. Out of a total of 389,000 federal stock numbers
reviewed, the quantities on 210,060 (54- per cent) were reduced
or deleted, 23,34-0 (6 per cent) were increased, and 155,600
(40 per cent) remained the same as the previous rate. When
1,827,967 demands by 900 ships were analyzed, a total of
287,981 of them were "not carried."^ This resulted in a
supply effectiveness rate of:
supply
_
total Wo. of issues (1,539,986)
_ o/izo/
effectiveness rate total No. of demands (1,827,967)
This rate compares favorably with the "pre-FLSIP" effective-
ness rates of 80.1 and 84-. 4- per cent. The 287,981 "not
Personal interview with J. Gumenick, Technical
Assistant, Weapons System Support Division, Naval Supply






carried" demands consisted of 191,016 federal stock numbers
of which 91.7 per cent were demanded two times or less by
the entire active fleet over a one-year period.
These data significantly reinforce the assumption that
the demand for spare parts aboard ship is highly random and
that, within any reasonable dollar constraints, it would be
difficult to exceed the middle-to-upper 80 percentile range
with regard to supply effectiveness. This writer submits that
this assumption is valid for aircraft spare parts as well.
Summary
This chapter has pointed out the importance of the
logistics aspect in regard to operational readiness. Various
methods of measuring operational readiness were described
and evaluated.
The negative effect, if any, that would accrue to
fleet readiness as a result of implementation of the Navy
Stock Fund inventory management system was discussed and
evaluated.
On the basis of the present state of fleet readiness
and the positive results of the recently implemented Fleet
Logistics Support Improvement Program for determining ship-
board spare parts, this writer has drawn the conclusion that
any effect on the operational readiness of naval aircraft






It has been the purpose of this paper to investigate
the feasibility of implementing the present Navy Stock Fund
inventory management and accounting system on board Naval
aircraft carriers in a manner which will allow efficient,
economical management without degradation of the operational
readiness of fleet units.
The technique of utilizing the stock funding system
for the management of inventories is neither new or unique
in supply management; nor is it a panacea for the multitude
of problems which confront the afloat inventory manager.
The stock funding procedure does, however, provide a control
mechanism for evaluation of the manager, as well as for
meeting the morale and motivational needs of the manager
through the use of participative management.
It has been demonstrated that the Navy Stock Fund has
proved to be an efficient and effective tool for almost
eighty years in the management of military inventories. Since
the establishment of the Navy Supply Fund in 1893, this




Congress to control and provide for the economical logistics
support of our weapon systems, both in peacetime and during
periods of conflict.
As a result of recognition "by the Hoover Commission
of the advantages of the Navy's system, the National Security
Act of 19^-7 provided the Secretary of Defense with the
authority for, and encouraged the use of, stock funds within
the military services. This method of management provided a
means for more effective control and accountability of program
costs within the Department of Defense.
The Navy Stock Fund concept was explained and evalu-
ated with regard to the advantages and disadvantages to be
accrued from its utilization in the management of inventories.
An evaluation was made of the effect of this concept on the
utilization of financial, material, and personnel resources
that this system would generate if implemented as a management
tool for Navy aircraft carrier inventories.
For a better evaluation of the advantages of the Navy
Stock Fund concept as compared with the present system, the
major problems of aeronautical support confronting the inven-
tory manager were discussed and analyzed. These major problems
concern excess stocks and low availability resulting from
erroneous provisioning, poor personnel morale and lack of
motivational factors for the managers of the present system,
and the decreasing operational readiness of fleet units.
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Within this paper an effort was made to show how the
Navy Stock Fund inventory management system would eliminate
or reduce these problems while providing for increased benefits
at lower costs.
Conclusions
It is the conclusion of this writer that the applica-
tion of the Navy Stock Fund inventory and accounting management
system to the shipboard spare parts inventories on board
Naval aircraft carriers is feasible. The implementation of
this method of management would provide for a level of fleet
readiness that is equivalent or superior to that presently
existing, and at a substantially reduced cost not only to the
operating commander but to the total aviation logistics system
as well.
This conclusion is based upon the following reasons:
1. Stock Fund financing of carrier inventories would
preclude the loss of operating funds presently incurred
because of the return of material to the system without credit.
As this material would be owned by the Stock Fund, there would
be no loss of operating funds.
2. The utilization of stock fund financing for afloat
aeronautical inventories would provide more flexibility in
the acquisition of inventories than is now possible under
operational funding. Critical shortages of operational funds
would not prevent the inventory manager from procuring and
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stocking material which would be consumed at a later date.
3. The sales/demand criteria for determining stock level
would prevent the inventory manager from stocking an excess
quantity of "non-moving" stock.
4. The management incentives resulting from participative
management and reduced stock levels would result in improved
utilization of personnel and physical resources.
5. Fleet readiness would not he degraded as a result
of reduced stock levels under the proposed concept, as the
material removed from inventories has an extremely high proba-
bility of not being required. There is a strong possibility
that fleet readiness may improve because of the capability
of stocking required items in increased depth with funds
generated by reduced stocking.
In summary, it is the conclusion of this writer that
the continuing squeeze between the incredible rise in weapon
system costs and the decreasing share of the nation's Gross
p
National Product (GMP) allocated to the Defense budget will
force the weapons managers to reduce their supporting inven-
tories to a more realistic level of required material, with
fewer "insurance" items.
"Stopping the Incredible Rise in Weapons Costs,"
Business Week , February 19, 1972, p. 60.
U.S., Department of Defense, Department of Defense
Budget for Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, January, 1972).
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When this time comes, predictably within the next
few years, the carrier supply officer will find that the
Navy Stock Fund Inventory and Accounting Management System
provides (in theory, if not in the "real world") the tools
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